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Race, Radicalism, and Reform: Historical
Perspective on the 1879 California
Constitution
By

I.

HARRY

N.

SCHEIBER*

Social Ills and Constitutional Cures: California in the 1870s

[The] corporations are not the great benefit to the people they are
said to be. They have laid their blighting hands upon every avenue
of labor, have prostrated industries, reduced wages to starvation
prices, and, in pursuance of this policy, have introduced into our
midst, to compete with our white labor, swarms of the most degraded race ....
-Delegate John Stedman1
The political campaign that led to the calling of a constitutional convention in California in 1878 was marked by strident, almost millennialist, rhetoric-a rhetoric noteworthy for its optimistic hopes, but also for
the despair with which many citizens viewed the state's problems and
*
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The author gratefully acknowledges that research for this article was supported in large
part by a senior fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities. I am indebted
to the work of several of my doctoral students who have written on California legal history,
especially Professors Sarah Sharp of Bowling Green State University, Charles W. McCurdy of
the University of Virginia, Mary Catherine Miller of Texas Tech University, Lucy Salyer of
the University of New Hampshire, Molly Selvin of RAND Corporation, and Arthur McEvoy
of Northwestern University. I am also indebted to the ideas of Professors Donald Pisani of
Texas A&M University and Joseph Grodin of the University of California, Hastings College of
the Law. The advice of Professor Paul W. Gates of Cornell University has been indispensable
in guiding my own research over the years on California law and history. My daughter, Susan
B. Scheiber, Esq., of Los Angeles, has shared with me an abiding interest in the state's constitutional history, and she has also let me consult her unpublished historical analysis of the
women's suffrage question in late nineteenth century California.
1. DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 521 (1880) [hereinafter DEBATES & PROCDGS.].
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prospects.2 As would so often be true in later periods of California history, many commentators perceived that the state's electorate carried a
special responsibility. This was expressed by a writer for the Sacramento
Bee who, in May 1878, asserted that California was
the natural leader of the other States in every reform that proposes
to solve the problems of social, commercial and political life.... It
is our business as citizens of the Golden State to set the world an
example, and show other States how they can emerge from the difficulties which
time, indifference and corruption have thrown
3
around them.
Far from seeing their state as "the great exception," 4 many advocates of reform joined in this call for California to fulfill its special
destiny as "a model for all other States." 5 Reformers calling for change
in 1873-78 did so in a political milieu that was profoundly influenced by
a protracted business depression-the worst the nation had experienced,
and one that hit California's economy hard. Urgency, despair, and a fair
degree of what was universally seen as radicalism were the responses
manifested in the state's politics in the late 1870s. Widespread unemployment and homelessness, a spread of business failures, mortgage fore2. Any study of the 1879 constitution and the politics of the convention period must
begin with C. SWISHER, MOTIVATION AND POLITICAL TECHNIQUE IN THE CALIFORNIA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1878-79 (1930).

An important historical work that goes well beyond Swisher's on the political climate of
the 1870s and on some of the major issues at the convention itself is S. Sharp, Social Criticism
in California During the Gilded Age (University of California, San Diego, 1979) (unpublished
dissertation). Her analysis draws heavily from the contemporary reform press and small periodicals as well as from the constitutional convention debates to illustrate its themes. See also
the following specialized studies: Moorhead, Sectionalism and the California Constitution of
1879, 12 PAC. HIST. REV. 287 (1943); Comford, To Save the Republic. The California Workingmen's Party in Humboldt County, 46 CAL. HIST. Q. 130 (1967); Shumsky, San Francisco's
Workingmen Respond to the Modern City, 55 CAL. HIST. Q. 46 (1976); Sargent, The California
ConstitutionalConvention of 1878-79, 6 CALIF. L. REV. 12 (1917). For an historical overview
of state constitutional conventions and revisions, see Sturm, The Development of State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 57 (1982).
3. CaliforniaLeadership,Bee (Sacramento), May 17, 1878, at 2, col. 2; see Sharp, supra
note 2, at 2.
4. See C. MCWILLIAMS, CALIFORNIA: THE GREAT EXCEPTION (1949). Exceptionalism
as a theme in California (and Pacific Slope) political culture and constitutional discourse had
two faces: the idea of uniqueness and a special destiny could be invoked, as was done in the
1870s, to validate moves toward reform, even radical reform, or alternatively, it could be
invoked to legitimize the perpetuation of differences in norms. This theme is discussed, inter
alia, by E. Pomeroy, in his classic work THE PACIFIC SLOPE: A HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA,
OREGON, WASHINGTON, IDAHO, UTAH, AND NEVADA (1965); and also in an important historical essay on the West and its regional consciousness by Gene Gressley, West by East: The
American West in the Gilded Age, 1 CHARLES REDD MONOGRAPHS IN WESTERN HISTORY
(1972).
5. CaliforniaLeadership,supra note 3.
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closures, and bank closings, a collapse of mining stock prices, and,
withal, extensive personal suffering and social dislocation, contributed to
radical political reactions and popular reformist attitudes.6
But even more deeply rooted discontents influenced the political atmosphere from which the campaign for constitutional reform would
soon issue. These discontents reflected disillusionment, and often keen
outrage, with how the political system was performing-a sense that
something had gone terribly wrong with political process, rather than a
concern solely with economic distress and its causes. 7 It was the probity
of politics and the workings of the polity itself in light of American
ideals-including the ideals embodied in the original 1849 California
Constitution as a product of Jacksonian political culture-that came
under the fire of reformers in this regard. Of course, such reform concerns were not confined to California in that era. In other states, the
startlingly rapid rise of concentrated corporate power, especially in the
railroad industry, and the problems associated with cynical partisanship
and corruption in government, had inspired strong political reactions on
similar lines. Reaction to the problems of the day had inspired many
efforts throughout the nation to apply old Jacksonian-egalitarian standards in legislation and to undertake constitutional reform and revision.8
This era was, after all, not only near the height of Gilded Age machine
politics; 9 it was also the era of the Granger laws in the Midwestern states
where voters had come to believe that strong constitutional medicine
must be applied to cure the ills that "monopoly" and unbridled corporate
6. C. SWISHER, supra note 2, at 5-9. On the national scene in the great depression of the
1870s, see Rezneck, Distress,Relief, and Discontentin the United States During the Depression
of 1873-1878, 58 J. POL. ECON. 494 (1950), reprintedin S. REZNECK, BUSINESS DEPRESSIONS
AND FINANCIAL PANICS: ESSAYS IN AMERICAN BUSINESS AND AMERICAN HISTORY 127; H.
SCHEIBER, H. VATTER & H. FAULKNER, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY (1976). On the
California scene in that era, see Hardy, Agricultural Changes in California, 1860-1900, PROCEEDINGS OF THE PACIFIC COAST BRANCH OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION,
216-30 (1929); Taylor, Foundations of American Rural Society, 24 CAL. HIST. SOC. Q. 193
(1945); 1. OPIE, THE LAW OF THE LAND 134-41 (1987).

7. C. SWISHER, supra note 2, at 114.
8. The embodiment of Jacksonian ideals of equality and open opportunity in the constitutional reform movements of the Midwest in the post-Civil War era is analyzed brilliantly in
an article by Alan Jones, Republicanism, Railroads,and Nineteenth Century Midwestern Constitutionalism, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND GOVERNMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION BEFORE THE NEW DEAL at 239 (E. Paul & H. Dickman eds. 1989). See Scheiber, Public
Policy, Constitutional Principle, and the Granger Laws: A Revised Historical Perspective 23
STAN. L. REV. 1029 (1971); A. BEITZINGER, EDWARD G. RYAN: LION OF THE LAW (1960).
9. See M. TWAIN & C. WARNER, THE GILDED AGE (1873); M. KELLER, AFFAIRS OF
STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 269 (1977) (corrupt alliance of entrepreneurship and politics); D. DONALD, LIBERTY AND UNION 248-55 (1978).
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power had inflicted upon the political system.10
In California in the seventies, the main focus of such criticism was
the evidence of pressure groups in Sacramento and the outright corruption of a state legislature that was then notoriously influenced by the
Central Pacific Railroad directorate, the giant land and cattle companies,
and a few other large-scale corporate interests.1 1 Critics also levied
charges that the judiciary had failed to function efficiently, or even to
pursue a truly independent course or render impartial judgments."2 Beyond their critique of formal constitutional structures and institutions,
reformers in many quarters also condemned the political party organizations as having cynically sold out to special interests." And so the litany
went in California-all against the background of violent political rhetoric on several sides, personal assaults on speakers and hecklers at polit10. See G. MILLER, RAILROADS AND THE GRANGER LAWS (1971). On political parties
in the Gilded Age, see C. YEARLEY, THE MONEY MACHINES: THE BREAKDOWN AND REFORM OF GOVERNMENTAL AND PARTY FINANCE IN THE NORTH,
KELLER, supra note 9.

1860-1920 (1970); M.

11. Thus an editorial writer in 1878 charged that the repeal of an earlier law creating a
board of commissioners for railroad regulation had been engineered by Leland Stanford "and a
corps of trained lieutenants" who "openly manipulated" the legislature on the issue. San
Francisco Chronicle, April 19, 1878, quoted in C. SWISHER, supra note 2, at 53. Swisher also
quotes the Sacramento Bee of April 18, 1878, to the effect that the railroad lobbyists had

"become strong enough and sufficiently trained in the artifices of the profession to overwhelm
an ordinary legislature." Id. See also W. BEAN, CALIFORNIA: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY

304-11 (2d ed. 1973).
Dissatisfaction with the legislature's performance would focus in the 1878-79 convention
upon the narrower, well-defined issue of its enactment of special legislation and local legislation. This had been complained of as early as 1862 and it continued, in the 1870s, to be a
major point in the indictment of the legislature's performance. See D. PISANI, FROM THE
FAMILY FARM TO AGRIBUSINESS: THE IRRIGATION CRUSADE IN CALIFORNIA AND THE

WEST, 1850-1931, at 22 (1984). The 1879 constitution imposed new requirements on the legislative process, curbing the practices associated with enactment of special or local laws. See id
at 24; infra notes 164-171 and accompanying text.
12. See The Judiciary: Some Suggestions for the New Constitution-A Remedy for the
Law's Delay-An Increase in the Number ofJusticesof the Supreme Court-AlternateJudgesA Number of Other Good Suggestions, Daily Alta California, Sept. 9, 1878, at 2, col. 2; Jurisdiction of Justices' Courts, Daily Alta California, Oct. 1, 1878, at 1, col. 1.
In one of the most widely noticed proposals for reform published prior to the convention,
the efficiency issue was raised by former California Supreme Court Justice Solomon
Heydenfeld. His study was initially "addressed to the bar of the State." Novelties in Constitution-Making, Daily Evening Bulletin (San Francisco), April 18, 1878, at 2, col. 2. See also E.
STANIFORD, THE PATTERN OF CALIFORNIA HISTORY 264-65 (1975) (on the criticisms leveled

at the judiciary's integrity and performance). In the convention, one of the Workingmen's
delegates flatly declared that one could assume that "[t]he railroad and other corporations...
own two thirds of the Courts of this State. Through their influence the Judges are elected to
place, who favor their cause." DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 610.
13. For surveys of reform opinion in the 1870s and the late nineteenth century in California, see W. BEAN, supra note 11, at 233-57; S. OLIN, CALIFORNIA POLITICS, 1846-1920: THE
EMERGING CORPORATE STATE (1981).
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ical meetings, and an intensifying campaign against the Chinese that
approached mass hysteria.1 4
A felt loss of political innocence and a yearning to recapture an
older golden age of republican politics constituted one major theme in
the public discourse on constitutional reform.' 5 A corollary reform
theme of the time was the quest for a golden mean in politics: the Northern California editor who called for nonpartisanship declared that the
kind of constitutional convention that was needed was one that "will
avoid on the one hand the Scylla of monopoly and on the other the Charybdis of Communism.... We want earnest, patriotic, intelligent men
there at Sacramento."' 6 In June 1878, at the height of the movement for
constitutional revision, the San FranciscoDaily Evening Bulletin editorialized on similar lines in favor of a basic reformation of politics:
The Republican party, in the day of its power, failed to do its duty
in this particular. The Democracy, which succeeded it, has betrayed its trust perhaps still more flagrantly. The movement
which, under such circumstances, will recommend itself to the
great mass of the people, must be one which, while opposing a firm
front to agrarianism on the one hand, is not the creature of monopoly influence on the other. How much there is to be expected from
either straight Democracy or straight Republicanism on the latter
proposition, the history of the State during the last few years abundantly proves. A just mean in politics is what is needed. The great
middle class must assert itself against the dangers by which it is
threatened on both sides. 7
14. C. SWISHER, supra note 2, at 10-16. Dennis Kearney, leader of the Workingmen's
party, see infra note 19 and text accompanying notes 34 and 42-43, was himself arrested and
detained for rioting and assault during the course of the campaign period. C. SWISHER, supra
note 2, at 12. Indicative of the rhetoric that filled the pages of the popular press were descriptions of Kearney as a "rattle-brained, foul-mouthed, blasphemous and ignorant arch-agitator"
(Kearney in the Toils, Daily Alta California, April 30, 1878, at 1, col. 1); of his followers as
"deluded people" and "side pocket babblers" (The Alien Vice President of the Workingmen's
Party on "Aliens'"Daily Alta California, Sept. 9, 1878, at I col. 1); or as "lazy non-producers
who would get their living by compelling the prudent and the thrifty to 'divide'" (Marysville
Daily Appeal, May 2, 1878, at 1, col. 1). The rhetoric of the radicals was equally inflammatory. See C. SWISHER, supra note 2, at 11 (quoting Workingmen's document).
15. For a fine analysis of this strain in political criticism of the day, particularly from the
radical Workingmen but also from delegates affiliated with the two regular parties, that addressed the theme of a lost political world of republican innocence, a subtle and sometimes
elusive issue, see Johnson, Centennial Retrospect: Legacy of the Past, in LAW AND CALIFORNIA SOCIETY: 100 YEARS OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION 5 (1980). See also S. OLIN, supra
note 13 at 11.

16. Facts Worthy of Consideration,Marysville Daily Appeal, June 14, 1878, at 2, col. 1.
17. An Analysis of Local Politics, Daily Evening Bulletin (San Francisco), June 11, 1878,
at 2, col. 1 (emphasis added).
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The nostalgic-or alternatively, optimistic--evocation of a purer
political order was often expressed in a harsh critical stance against the
regular parties. Conservative commentators were alarmed by the specter
of convention elections turned into "regular guerrilla contest[s],"I 8 and
they despaired that the major parties could not successfully outflank the
radical movement led by Dennis Kearney in San Francisco. 9 In the face
of the rising threat of "Socialism and Communism," a Marysville newspaper declared, it was necessary "for self-protection" that "wise action
and firm determination in behalf of law and order" be placed above considerations of party. 2° The best hope lay in emergence of "one harmonious phalanx," transcending old party ties, that would overcome the
influence of ignorant radicalism. 2 1 It was a new organic law, after all, a
constitution that was at stake, wrote the editors of the Oakland
Democrat:
There is to be neither Republicanism nor Democracy, as party tenets, embodied in the instrument to be framed [by the convention],
but Americanism, if we may so speak, in contradiction to French
Communism, German Red Republicanism, or the still wilder agrarian notions which have recently been so loudly proclaimed even in
this country among the less intelligent classes. 22
Similarly, the Los Angeles Express called on the voters to send men of
high character to the convention, warning that delegates were needed
"who will not thrust themselves into the filthy pool of politics .... ,2
Economic issues were never far from the forefront, however, in the
political debates of the late 1870s. Ever since the first days of AngloAmerican occupation, throughout the long period of heady optimism
about California's future, and climaxing in the difficult years of the 187379 depression, the land question had been a burning issue in state politics. Complex claims dating from the days of Mexican grants were long
in being resolved by the courts, making it difficult for common settlers to
gain title to land, 24 and the adjudication of claims went forward in a
climate rife with frauds.2 ' Apart from demanding access to the lands of
the state, settlers were also continuously agitated over the terms of Cali18. A Decidedly Mixed Election, Marysville Daily Appeal, May 11, 1878, at 2, col. 1.
19. On Kearney and the Workingmen, see Kauer, The Workingmen's Partyof California,
13 PAC. HisT. REv. 278 (1944); I. CROSS, A HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA (1935); see also infra notes 25, 34, 42-43 and accompanying text.
20. A Decidedly Mixed Election, Marysville Daily Appeal, May 11, 1878, at 2, col. 1.
21. What is Needed is a GeneralRepresentation ofAll the Honest Classes, Daily Alta Cali-

fornia,
22.
23.
24.
25.

April 18,, 1878, at 1, col. 2.
Id.
Id.
Gates, California'sEmbattled Settlers, 41
Id. at 116-21.

CALIF.

HIST. Soc. Q. 99, 99-103 (1962).
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fornia and national land laws under which they could gain title for pursuit of farming or other enterprises.2 6 Because it was indisputable that
the land system had produced serious and seemingly intractable
problems for California society, political reformers hit a sensitive nerve
with the electorate when they addressed the inequities of land distribution and demanded effective redress from the effects of-the aggregation of
some of America's largest landed holdings. 27 The land issue effectively
merged with that of "monopoly" in the rhetoric and the larger concerns
of political reformers and social critics. 28 The first party platform to be
adopted by the radical California Workingmen's movement, which eventually carried the major burden of pushing for a constitutional convention, adverted to the twin problems of concentrated wealth and political
corruption. This famous document declared that "equal rights of the
people . . . [had been] violated until the administration of justice has
26. Gates, Pre-Henry George Land Warfare in California, 46 CAL. HIST. Soc. Q. 121
(1967); McCurdy, Stephen J. Field and Public Land Law Development in California, 18501866: A Case Study ofJudicialResource Allocation in Nineteenth-CenturyAmerica, 10 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 235 (1976); Hornbeck, The Patentingof California'sPrivate Land Claims, 18511885, 59 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 440 (1979).
27. See C. SWISHER, supra note 2, at chap. 1; Gates, supra note 24, at 99; Gates, Public
Land Disposalin California,49 AGRIC. HIsT. 158 (1975); Miller, Law and Entrepreneurship in
California: Miller and Lux and California Water Law, 1879-1928 (University of California,
San Diego, 1982) (unpublished dissertation); see also Taylor, Foundationsof CaliforniaRural
Society, 24 CALIF. HIsT. Soc. Q. 193 (1945); Gates, CarpetbaggersJoin the Rush for California
Land, 56 CALIF. HIsT. Soc. Q. 98 (1977).
None of what is said in the text about popular grievances is meant to suggest that the
"small settlers," as they are usually called, had no interest themselves in speculation on
whatever scale they could afford. On the California frontier as on all others in American
history, today's "small" claimant often aspired to become tomorrow's monopolist or largescale speculator. Real estate bonanzas were not invented in the boom years after World War
II. See P. GATES, THE FARMER'S AGE: AGRICULTURE, 1815-60, at 70-98, 387-97 (1960)
(land speculation and California).
Hence the reference to small-scale operators as speculators (in addition to their role as
potential farmers) recognizes one of the persistent realities of the nineteenth century West. See
Gates, supra note 24, at 100-01. For an overview of land problems and agriculture in the state,
see W. ROBINSON, LAND IN CALIFORNIA (1940).
28. As was true of the rhetoric of the Jacksonian era, the terms "monopoly" and "monopoly power" were used broadly to denote illegitimate exercises of influence, associated with
aggregations of private wealth and especially corporate wealth. On the Jacksonians, see A.
SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF JACKSON (1945); B. HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS FROM
THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR (1957); E. PESSEN, JACKSONIAN AMERICA: SOCIETY,
PERSONALITY, AND POLITICS (1978). See also supra note 8. In the 1878-79 debates of reform,
as Dr. Sharp has shown, the charge of "monopoly" was invoked not only on the most dramatic
basic issues such as water use and land ownership, but also to take in such practices as the state
authorities' favoring of publishers in the selection of school textbooks. Sharp, supra note 2, at
73-75. For the background in Colorado and the larger history of water law issues in western
constitutional politics, see G. BAKKEN, ROCKY MOUNTAIN CONSTITUTION MAKING, 18501912 (1987).

42
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become a mockery and a farce."2 9 The new party promised "to wrest the
government from the hands of the rich and place it in those of the people,
where it properly belongs."

30

The notion that greedy promoters and wealthy interests had
grabbed power-not only at the expense of the laborers and artisans, but
also to the peril of the republic's core integrity-was an idea often expressed in ensuing months, both in the political hustings and on the floor
of the 1878-79 constitutional convention at Sacramento.3" Not only the
Workingmen, but also many elements of the two major parties expressed
this concern to recapture the republic, somehow, for the people-to get
rid of an "imported feudalism" that had validated monopoly landholdings and encouraged the appearance of great disparities in wealth. 32 It
was necessary, declared the constitution of the Workingmen's Party, to
halt the process by which "great money monopolies ... purchase the
state legislatures, rule the courts, influence all public officers, and...
perverted the great republic of our fathers into a den of dishonest

manipulators." 33
Important as were political reform concerns, the most vividly
remembered feature of the 1870s political movements is the notorious
campaign directed against the Chinese. Although the anti-Chinese
29. W. DAVIS, HISTORY OF POLITICAL CONVENTIONS IN CALIFORNIA, 1849-1892, at

366, 384 (1893).
30. Reprinted in W. DAVIS, supra note 29, at 366-67. On the precedents and results of
Workingmen's agitation, see generally R. Shaffer, Radicalism in California, 1869-1929, at 7-64
(University of California, Berkeley, 1962) (unpublished dissertation).
31. Professor David Johnson has argued as follows:
For those who wrote the new [1879] constitution, the increasing concentration of
wealth alongside deepening poverty represented ... a betrayal of the 'great republic
of our fathers'; that is, the destruction of a society in which individual labor and
enterprise was rewarded with autonomy, social mobility, and a share of the public
powers.
Johnson, supra note 15, at 6. This theme is noted occasionally, though not emphasized, in
Swisher's analysis of the debates. C. SWISHER, supra note 2.
32.

DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at

1139-40 (comments of Delegate James

O'Sullivan (Workingmen's Party)).

33. W. DAVIS, supra note 29, at 379. This sentiment was set forth in the convention itself
by many speakers, but typical of the sentiments expressed by Workingmen delegates was the
following passage from a speech by Patrick Dowling of San Francisco:
Corporations have bought up conventions and swayed Legislatures as if by a magic
wand. They have even entered into the sacred presence of the United States Senate
chamber. Why, sir, Senators are but machines and Representatives tools in their
hands. In fact they run the ship of State. They have the control of the whole government, and certainly we cannot say but that the judiciary to-day in California, as well
as in every other State in the Union, is dishonored with their contaminating
influence.
DEBATES AND PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 550.
For a perceptive discussion of corporate behavior and the possibilities of reining in corporate power through reform laws, see Sharp, supra note 2, at 114.,
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movement was pursued most relentlessly by the Workingmen's leadership, these radicals enjoyed abundant support from other quarters.3 4 The
"Chinese question" was, indeed, an issue with which the radicals could
sweep in allies with very different views on other social or political issues
but whose anti-Chinese prejudice was equally virulent. 35 The size of the
Chinese population was growing significantly in California, though it still
formed less than ten percent of the state's population of nearly a million
in 1879. Against their presence, however, the European-American elements railed with a savagery that transcended all limits of ordinary political discourse even in an age of harsh rhetoric.3 6
The stridency of rhetoric directed against Chinese was in many ways
more than matched by harsh and outright cruel treatment. This was true
both of informal social relationships and of public policies. 3? Thus, on
occasions when federal judges had taken a protective and expansive view
of Chinese immigrants' procedural and substantive constitutional
rights-as had been true during the long years of Judge Ogden Hoffman's tenure in the United States district court in San Francisco-the
public reaction was often truly vicious. 38 Conversely, there was manifest
public approval when the United States circuit court moved strongly in
the other direction in 1878, when Judge Lorenzo Sawyer handed down a
decision in San Francisco in the case of In re Ah,3 9 which denied the
34. See T. HTTELL, HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA 594-640 (1898); Sharp, supra note 2, at
153-56; Taylor, supra note 6, at 194-217.
35. See A. SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY: LABOR AND THE ANTI-CHINESE
MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA (1971); G. BARTH, BITTER STRENGTH: A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE IN THE UNITED STATES 1850-1870 (1964); E. SANDMYER, THE ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA (1939).
36. See A. SAXTON, supra note 35; S. CHAN, THIS BITTERSWEET SOIL: THE CHINESE IN
CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE, 1860-1910 (1986); L. Salyer, Guarding the 'White Man's Frontier': Courts, Politics, and the Regulation of Immigration, 1891-1924 (University of California,
Berkeley, 1989) (unpublished dissertation).
37. A. SAXTON, supra note 35, passim. Recent scholarship has shown that to a surprising
degree the federal trial and appeal courts extended procedural protections across a broad front
to Chinese immigrants and residents long before the well known decision of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (applying the Fourteenth Amendment). On the Chinese in the
courts in the pre-Convention era, see especially McClain, The Chinese Strugglefor Civil Rights
in Nineteenth Century America: The First Phase, 1850-1870, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 529 (1984).
38. C. Fritz, San Francisco's First Federal Court: Ogden Hoffman and the Northern District of California, 1851-1891 (University of California, Berkeley, 1987) (unpublished dissertation). See also Fritz, A Nineteenth Century 'Habeas Corpus Mill" The Chinese Before the
FederalCourts in California,32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 347 (1988); and, for an analysis of the
federal district court in San Francisco as concerned procedural issues affecting the status of
Chinese immigrants in later years, see Salyer, Captives of the Law: JudicialEnforcement of the
Chinese Exclusion Laws, 1891-1905, 76 J. AM. HIST. 91 (1989).
39. In re Ah Yup, I F. Cas. 223 (C.C.D. Cal. 1878) (No. 104). The decision, by Judge
Sawyer, was reported fully under the title Not "White Persons" in the Daily Alta California,
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right of Chinese-born immigrants to qualify for naturalization as citizens. 4' This important development in the law, closely watched in the
midst of a powerful political debate, doubtless served to lend further legitimacy to anti-Chinese hysteria.
In the highly charged atmosphere of intensifying political strife and
economic distress in the late 1870s, there proved to be strong support for
the idea that enduring solutions should be sought through constitutional
reform. To seek broad solutions instead through ordinary legislation, after all, would have required working through a process and institutions
in which most California citizens had lost faith. With the leadership being taken at various times by independent and "fusion" political
groups-by the Workingmen, by shifting partisan coalitions, and by the
Democratic Party-various proposals for the summoning of a convention were put forward in the Assembly during the years 1873 to 1877." t
A unique role in crystallizing political discontent on the issue of
constitutional reform was played by Dennis Kearney, the leader of the
Workingmen's movement in San Francisco, where a quarter of the state's
population resided. Kearney's style expressed an explosive compound of
authentic social radicalism, a gift for charismatic leadership, and a
penchant for evoking an ugly and potent racism.4 2 Whether one deems
him a demagogue or an organizing genius, he quickly fashioned a strong
third-party movement in northern California, with some strength almost
everywhere in the state. Kearney and his followers successfully pressed
for the calling of a convention in the legislature, and their radical presence in the ensuing campaign for election of delegates dictated nearly all
the key strategical moves by the Republican and Democratic state party
leaders-even prompting an effort by the two major parties' state committees to develop a slate of fusion candidates for the statewide at-large
delegate election that would head off the Kearneyite threat.4 3
In some districts, the Democrats and Republicans put partisan
slates on the ballot for the local delegate elections. For the thirty-two atlarge candidates, fusion and nonpartisan slates were developed, but then
April 30, 1878, at 2, col. 2; see Przybyzszewski, Judge Lorenzo Sawyer and the Chinese Civil
Rights Decisions in the Ninth Circuit, I W. LEGAL HisT. 23, 29 (1988) (Judge Sawyer, "con-

fronted with 'the first application made by a native Chinaman for naturalization,' examined
the congressional debates and ruled that the application could not be accepted, it being clear
that the congressmen had used the word 'white' precisely in order to exclude the Chinese.").
40. Id. See McClain, supra note 37.
41. C. SWISHER, supra note 2, at 5-31.

42. Id. at 11.
43. Id. at 18-21. Contemporary newspaper accounts provided detailed reports of the maneuvers involving the two parties, fusion efforts, and realignments; see especially Attempt at
Coalition, Daily Evening Bulletin (San Francisco), April 25, 1878, at 2, col. 3.
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finally the Democrats ran their own ticket, and a significant number of
independents-including one woman candidate in San Joaquin County
who took advantage of the inapplicability of the male-only requirement
that prevailed for office holding in the legislature-entered their names in
contention. 44
Of the 152 delegates elected, 50 were Kearneyites. Thus, while "the
Goths and Vandals of Kearneyism' ' as were a force to be reckoned with,
they did not have nearly enough votes to control. 46 Fusion and "nonpartisan" candidates, many of them long-time party regulars who distanced
themselves from the party machines for reasons of convenience, together
formed the convention majority on most issues.4 7
The delegates were convened in Sacramento in October, and the
convention's debates were closely followed and fully reported by the
newspapers of the state. Some critics charged that it became a "runaway" convention, since the delegates did not confine themselves to the
major issues (corporate powers, railway regulation, land monopoly, taxation, and the Chinese question) that had prompted the legislature to
make the convention call. Indeed, a determined (but outgunned) conservative faction within the convention contended that the 1849 constitution should be retained nearly intact. "Under it," as one of them
pleaded,
there has been consummated more of general progress, more generally diffused happiness and prosperity, than has ever before been
realized in the same period of time by any other people on the
globe. For more than a quarter of a century it has held in equilibrium ... the rivalries of sections, the antagonistic customs, the
clashing prejudices and passions of all the alien races of the
earth.... Let us amend it [only] in a few particulars ....48
Apart from the "runaway" charge, the delegates were chastised more
generally by editors and politicians for running up the costs and exceed44. The alignments and realignments of the Democratic and fusion forces are discussed in
the Marysville Daily Appeal, May 11, 1878 and June 14, 1878; and the San Francisco Daily
Evening Bulletin, April 25, 1878 and April 30, 1878. The woman who placed her name in
contention was Mrs. Laura DeForce Gordon. The degree of seriousness with which the press
greeted her candidacy is indicated by the following editorial in the Marysville Daily Appeal:
"That's right. Laura belongs to the independent line, and we hope she will be elected just for
the novelty of the thing." Facts Worthy of Consideration,supra note 16.
45. The Dangers of Kearneyism, Daily Alta California, June 19, 1878, at 1, col. 1.
46. For full analysis of the delegates and their background, and also of the organization of
the convention and its modus operandi, see C. SWISHER, supra note 2, at 17-44.
47. Most prominent in this regard was Joseph P. Hoge, elected president of the convention, whose choice for that office was welcomed by, among others, the editors of the conservative Daily Alta California. Presidentof the Convention, Daily Alta California, Oct. 1, 1878, at
1, col. 1.
48. DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 496.
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ing legislative appropriations; and in fact, they never were paid their
small daily expense allowances for the full time they spent in
deliberations.

49

In any event, the great majority of the convention's delegates clearly
regarded their charge to be a reappraisal of the 1849 document in all its
terms. The delegates met for more than five months, appointing drafting
committees on all the major issues, and extending their concerns to a
variety of other matters, some of which became prominent in subsequent
convention debates. These included women's suffrage; separation of
church and state and the status of sectarian schools; uniformity of textbooks, policy on vocational education, and other matters relating to the
public schools; the autonomous powers to be given to the University of
California board of regents; abolition of the grand-jury requirement in
criminal indictments; tidelands leasing and alienability; and, across a
broad spectrum, the powers of municipal government and the restructuring of the state judicial system. °
Near the end of their extended debates, the delegates accepted on
the final draft revision a series of controversial compromises in language
that watered down some of the most radical proposals that had won
strong support, prompting one of the Workingmen's leaders to complain:
"We have, in the last few days, trimed [sic] it down until it is a mere
wreck of its former grandeur."5 1 However the radicals may have felt on
that score, the convention finally approved the new document in March
1879. The instrument was submitted to the state's voters in May, and,
after a bitterly fought campaign, was approved by the fairly close margin
of 77,959 to 67,134.2
The contrast with 1849 bespoke the difference in political atmosphere between these two constitutional moments in California legal history: the original document had been adopted by the overwhelming vote
49. The legislature had appropriated $150,000 for the convention's expenses, but the entire sum was exhausted on the eighty-fifth day. The convention went on for 157 days in all,
until March 3, 1879. Requests by the convention for additional funds were simply ignored.
See Johnson, California'sConstitution of 1879: An Unpaid Debt, 49 CALIF. HIST. Soc. Q. 135

(1970).
50. See, e.g., DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 1014-17, 1369-70 (suffrage); 1038-39
(tidelands); 97, 99, 138-39 (schools); 237, 118, 220-21, 228 (municipal powers); 435 (Regents of
the University of California); 497 (prison administration); see also Goda, The HistoricalBackground of California'sConstitutionalProvisionsProhibitingAid to Sectarian Schools, 46 CALIF.
HIST. Soc. Q. 149 (1967). The analysis of education law and policy in Sharp, supra note 2,
contains a full discussion of issues such as vocational and agricultural education that were
important in the 1870s but have been given little attention in other historical studies.
51. DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 1438.
52. C. SWISHER, supra note 2, at 109.
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of 12,064 to 811 in the November 1849 ballot." Once approved, in any
event, the 1879 constitution went into effect in two prescribed phases:
the powers of governmental officers and their terms came into conformand the remaining proviity with the new constitution on July 4, 1879,
54
sions became effective on January 1, 1880.
Carl Brent Swisher, whose classic study of the convention still
stands as the most complete scholarly work on the subject after nearly
sixty years in print, was of the opinion that the convention movement
reflected a disturbing tendency in the California electorate in the 1870s
"to look for panaceas for their ills . . . ."'I An element of irrationality
prevailed, Swisher contended, for "there was little intelligent consideration given to the question of what might be legitimately expected to be
achieved by revision of the fundamental law of the state." 56
Swisher's gloomy assessment, that the whole convention movement
was an essentially misguided enterprise, is probably unfair. Still,
whatever the delegates expected of constitutional reform, we can profitably examine what it is they sought to accomplish. Contrary to the impression conveyed by Swisher's analysis, I would argue that one can find
significant coherence in many basic social and political goals. In addition, despite important differences of ideology and political style among
delegate factions, there emerged a fair degree of realism in their deliberations of mechanisms and direction of reforms; one does not sense that the
delegates, or those who sent them to Sacramento, were completely at sea
as to the purpose or potentialities of constitution writing.
Nevertheless, as countless observers from that day to Swisher's and
on to our own have testified, the constitutional document produced by
the convention had its faults. A variety of commentators of all political
stripes have inveighed mightily against the 1879 document; the most
memorable contemporary response was that of the celebrated reformer
Henry George. On the eve of the popular vote on ratification, George
condemned the product of the convention's long months of work as a
"sort of mixture of constitution, code, stump speech, and mandamus"! 7
53. Crotty, The CaliforniaConstitutionalConvention of 1849, 31 HIST. SOC'Y OF S. CAL.
Q. 155, 165 (1949).
54. CAL. CONST. art. XXII, §§ 1-4 (1879, repealed 1972); id., §§ 10-12 (1879, repealed
1960); see also T. HrrTELL, supra note 34, at 637-39.
55. C. SWISHER, supra note 2, at 18. The modem student needs to supplement a reading
of Swisher's work, as mentioned earlier, by reference to the more embracing study of reform in
contemporary California by Sharp, supra note 2.
56. C. SWISHER, supra note 2, at 18, 114-16.
57. George, The Kearney Agitation in California, 17 POPULAR SCI. MONTHLY, 433, 445

(1880). George's early views of political process are also set out in his article Bribery in Elections, 7 OVERLAND MONTHLY 497 (1871).
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George undoubtedly evaluated the new constitution with such dismay not only because it bore the features (as he said) of a hopeless hybrid, but mostly because it failed to work a revolution in property
rights-which, after all, was George's main concern. The constitution
was "anything but agrarian or communistic," George wrote, for "it entrenches vested rights-especially in land-more thoroughly than before,
and interposes barriers to future radicalism by a provision in regard to
amendments which will require almost a revolution to break through."58
Other criticisms have come from many perspectives over the years,
but the main rap against the 1879 document-both the original constitution and its many revised versions-has remained fairly constant. First,
in the view of nearly all critics, the 1879 document was too much a collection of detailed and highly specified codes that would better have been
left to ordinary legislation. And so it remains today, after 110 years,
scores of amendments, and a thorough legislative revision during 196470-including efforts intended to improve it by separating out the authentically "constitutional" issues from lesser ones.5 9 Ironically, any
gains made in 1970 by purging the document of excessive detail and of
provisions more properly "legislative" have been more than overbalanced
since then by the profligate use and often devastating effects of the modern direct ballot for constitutional revision.60
Second, as Henry George complained, the "stump speech" feature
was a prominent element of the document's mongrel ideological physiognomy. Soaring rhetoric is prominent in segments of the constitution,
sometimes not clearly connected to any concrete purpose associated with
rule-making. And yet one hesitates to condemn it all out of hand as
empty phrase-making-what in the convention debates occasionally was
denounced as "humbug" or as a banal effort to "engraft some political
58. George, The Kearney Agitation in California, supra note 57, at 446, quoted in C.
SWISHER, supra note 2, at 110. For analysis of Henry George as an economic theorist and
social reformer, see 3 J. DORFMAN, THE ECONOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION
(1865-1918) 142-49 (1949); S. FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL WELFARE STATE: A
STUDY OF CONFLICT IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1865-1901 (1956); J. THOMAS, ALTERNATIVE
AMERICA: HENRY GEORGE, EDWARD BELLAMY, HENRY DEMAREST LLOYD AND THE ADVERSARY TRADITION (1983); Caine, The Origins of Progressivism, in THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

11 (L. Gould ed. 1974).
59. See Spear, The Politics of ConstitutionalChange, in LAW AND CALIFORNIA SOCIETY:
100 YEARS OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION 23 (1980); see also the discussion of the revision

process and its goals by the revision commission's chairman, Judge Sumner, in THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES . .. [AND] CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AS LAST

AMENDED NOVEMBER 3, 1970, at 109-20 (1972).
60. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
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pyrotechnics upon the fundamental law .... ,,61 After all, some of the
broad and glittering generalizations, admonitions, and exhortations that
George condemned are the very phrases that one hears praised today as
an expression of American ideals-the very kind of phrases, indeed, that
Professor Fritz extolled in his reappraisal of the original California Con-

stitution of

1849.62

Third, an indictment of the 1879 document rests solidly on a consequential argument that focuses upon one of the convention's most ardently pursued goals: the legal disablement and, ultimately, the physical
exclusion of the Chinese. In this regard, the instrument included a set of
provisions not only vicious in intent but clearly at odds with the Fourteenth Amendment. These provisions were cast in constitutional terms,
but any real force that they might have had was represented in appeals to
Congress to do its "duty" and put a halt to Chinese immigration.63
Here, more than anywhere else in the document, did anger and blatant
grandstanding triumph over realism. Within a decade, the federal courts
had dismantled the most important provisions aimed at depriving the
Chinese of means of earning a fair living in California or sharing in4 the
benefits of residence (let alone citizenship) under a regime of law.
Also illuminated by the politics of constitutional reform in this episode of California's history was an interpretive controversy that has recently absorbed the attention of American legal historians. Some, who
have presented their work from a self-designatedly "radical" or "critical"
posture, have been prone to condemn in a wholesale way the nineteenthcentury American legal system and constitutional order as crudely exploitative. Specifically, they argue that the law systematically twists and
61. DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 1182.
62. See Fritz, More Than "Shredsand Patches'" California'sFirstBill of Rights, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13 (1989).
63. DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 634, 703, 713-27, 1186 passim; see also analysis of the debate and specific proposals on the Chinese in C. SWISHER, supra note 2, at 86-99;
Sharp, supra note 2.
64. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); In re Tiburcio Parrot, 1 F. 481 (C.C.D.
Cal. 1880); In re Lee Sing, 43 F. 359 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1890). The fate of the anti-Chinese
provisions, in a series of challenges before the federal lower courts and the United States
Supreme Court, has been examined in several scholarly works, including Roche, EntrepreneurialLiberty andthe FourteenthAmendment, 4 LAB. HIST. 3 (1963); McCurdy, Justice
Field and the Jurisprudenceof Government-Business Relations: Some Parametersof Laissez
FaireConstitutionalism,1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970 (1975), reprintedin AMERICAN LAW
& THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 246 (L. Friedman & H.
Scheiber eds. 1988); McClain, supra note 37 (on the Chinese). How immigrants were treated
under federal law, including discrimination by the federal administrative authorities and the
extension of significant protection by the United States District Court, Northern District of
California, is a subject examined afresh for the period 1850-1880 in Fritz, A Nineteenth Century 'Habeas Corpus Mill', supra note 38; and Salyer, supra note 36 (post-1880 period).
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shapes the rules of economic life to advance entrepreneurial interests,
and to transfer wealth and power from the poor (and perhaps the middling elements) to those already rich and powerful. The implication of
this view-which is a leading premise in much of the historically oriented
writing of the school that calls itself "Critical Legal Studies"-is that, if
popular democracy had only been given its way, such distortions of law
would not have been permitted.6 5 Yet in California at the height of radical Workingmen's reformism in the 1870s, and amidst calls for redistribution of wealth and power that would favor labor and the poor, we have
a laboratory case study in the operations of plebiscitary democracy in
action. No intermediating issues or structures-no judges bound by their
class assumptions and interests, no corrupt legislatures-stood in the
way when white male voters went to the polls in a popular vote on the
constitution. And, as it proved, no single issue mobilized popular forces
so effectively, or produced so powerful a response, as the racism and prejudice of the anti-Chinese movement. The romanticism that inheres in
the "critical" historians' view of exploitation in the nineteenth centuryits sources, how it was perpetuated, and with what results-can hardly
survive exposure to the harsh facts of an episode such as this one in the
history of the Golden State.6 6
Thus, if one is to take an historical view of exploitation, one had
better give closer attention to some of these episodes of plebiscitary democracy in the nineteenth century; and one should do the same in appraising direct democracy today, given the actual effects on law and
65. See CriticalLegal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1(1984); cf Scheiber, Public
Economic Policy and the American Legal System: HistoricalPerspectives, 1980 Wis. L. REv.
1159, 1182-89; Friedman, American Legal History: Pastand Present,in AMERICAN LAW AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER supra note 64, at 464, 467-68; Scheiber, DoctrinalLegacies and
Institutional Innovations: Law and the Economy in American History, in id. at 451, 459-62;
Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 1383. For the "exploitation"
view, see M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1790-1860 at 63, 259-60
passim (1976). Contra Scheiber, Law and American Agricultural Development, 52 AGRIC.
HIST. 439 (1978).
I have used the term "school" because these historians have so designated and grouped
themselves, not because I am persuaded either (1) that historians who choose to stand outside
that self-designated circle are by any means less "critical" in their attempts at realism in understanding the American legal system's historic performance, flaws and all; or (2) that the Critical Legal Studies movement itself has enough coherence and agreement, regarding either
method or substantive views, that it constitutes a "school" in the classic application of that
concept. It is manifest that even the friendliest of in-group analysts often have problems identifying what is held in common, beyond a roughly defined ideological slant. See, eg., Trubek,
Where the Action Is: CriticalLegal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REXV. 575 (1984).
66. See Scheiber, Xenophobia and Parochialismin the History ofAmerican Legal Process:
From the Jacksonian Era to the Sagebrush Rebellion, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 625, 648-59
(1982).
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policy of the direct ballot-a reform for which such high hopes were held
out in the Progressive era amendments to the state constitutions in California and elsewhere.67
Indeed, even the origins of the direct ballot in California political
history bore some startling resemblances to the constitutional reform of
forty years earlier that is our main concern here. The famous Progressive uprising in California revealed that the juxtaposition of social reform
with racist attacks upon Asian immigrant minorities was a recurrent
theme in the state's history. For when Governor Hiram Johnson
presented the legislature with the Progressive program in the form of his
"Ten Commandments" in 1910, he made one of the program's key proposals a measure that would restrict and forbid landowning by Japanese
residents. 68 Again, as in 1879, measures to bring "the interests" to heel,
or to advance the dreams of a yeoman Arcadia in an industrial age, came
forth from political leaders who carried a reform banner in one hand and
a "Whites Only" placard in the other.
67. On the effects of the direct ballot, see the recent analysis by Lee, Power to the People?
DirectDemocracy:A View from the States, in FEDERALISM: STUDIES IN HISTORY, LAW, AND
POLICY 131 (H. Scheiber ed. 1988). See also Lee, California,in REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY 87 (D. Butler & A. Ranney eds. 1978); Ranney,
The United States ofAmerica, in id at 80; D. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON
BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1984); W. CROUCH, J. BOLLENS & S. SCOTT,
CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS (1977).
Outstanding in the literature of scholarly criticism directed at the initiative and referendum are Fischer, Ballot Propositions: The Challenge of Direct Democracy to State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 43 (1983); Wolfinger & Greenstein, The
Repeal of FairHousing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting, 62 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 753 (1968) (on the advantages of legislative over direct-ballot process); and Note, Initiative and Referendum-Do They Encourage or Impair Better State Government?, 5 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 925 (1977). See also Bone & Benedict, Perspectiveson DirectLegislation: Washington State's Experience, 1914-1973, 28 W. POL. Q. 330 (1975). For an up-to-date discussion of
the issues of exploitation, racism, consensus, and democracy in the nineteenth century, see the
synthesis in K. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1989). Compare
the analysis in L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1985).
68. On the immediate background and larger political context of anti-Japanese prejudice
in relation to California progressivism, in addition to discussion of Hiram Johnson as reformer,
see R. DANIELS, THE POLITICS OF PREJUDICE: THE ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JAPANESE EXCLUSION 46-64 (1962).
See also Y.
ICHIHASHI, JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES: A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE PROBLEMS OF
THE JAPANESE IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR CHILDREN 228-42 (1932); S. OLIN, CALIFORNIA'S
PRODIGAL SONS: HIRAM JOHNSON AND THE PROGRESSIVES, 1911-1917 (1968); W. BEAN,

supra note 11, at 332-35.
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II. Historical Memory and the 1879 Constitution: From
Amnesia to Consciousness to Celebration
A growing tendency is observed to neglect the study of the history
of the law and its traditions, without the knowledge of which the
student can never become imbued with the true spirit of
Jurisprudence.
-Serranus

Clinton Hastings (1878)69

In the past quarter century of California politics, but especially in
very recent years, the 1879 California Constitution has been prominent
in the state's political discourse mainly because of its Declaration of
Rights. 70 The declaration's provisions, carried over in many particulars
from the 1849 document, have taken a remarkable place in recent national constitutional politics and jurisprudence, as the California
Supreme Court has played a leading role in71 developing the doctrine of
"adequate and independent state grounds.,
The California court has premised a long line of major decisions
upon provisions of the state declaration of rights, thereby expanding
rights which otherwise would have been restricted by dint of federal constitutional decisions. 72 As a consequence, a dramatic line of constitu69. Serranus Clinton Hastings, C.J., quoted as title-page inscription to R. POWELL, COMPROMISES OF CONFLICTING CLAIMS: A CENTURY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, 1760 TO 1860
(1977).
70. CAL. CoNST. art. I (1879).
71. On independent state grounds generally, see Symposium on State Courts and Federalism in the 1980s, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 599 (1981); Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324 (1982); The Emergence of
State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1347 (1985); Howard, Federalismat the Bicentennial, in FEDERALISM, supra note 67, at 3; Howard, The Renaissance of State Constitutional
Law, 1988 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 1 (1988); Mosk, The State Courts, in AMERICAN LAW: THE THIRD CENTURY: THE LAW BICENTENNIAL VOLUME 213-28 (B. Schwartz
ed. 1976). On California's leading role in particular, see Falk, The State Constitution:A More
than "Adequate'Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 273 (1973); Bice, Anderson and the
Adequate State Ground, 45 So. CAL. L. REV. 750 (1972); Goldberg, Stanley Mosk A Federalist
for the 1980s, 12 HASTINGS CONT. L.Q. 395 (1985).
72. See Falk, supra note 71, at 277-78 (compilation of early cases); In re Anderson, 69
Cal. 2d 613, 447 P.2d 117, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1968) (counsel for convicts under death sentence
at post-automatic appeal level); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955) (exclusionary rule and unlawful search and seizure); In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d 137, 436 P.2d 273, 65
Cal. Rptr. 273 (1968) (contempt of court).
In one of the most important California cases, Justice Mosk declared:
[In] the area of fundamental civil liberties-which includes.., all protections of the
California Declaration of Rights-we sit as a court of last resort, subject only to the
qualification that our interpretations may not restrict the guarantees accorded the
national citizenry under the federal charter. In such constitutional adjudication, our
first referent is California law and the full panoply of rights Californians have come
to expect as their due. Accordingly, decisions of the United States Supreme Court
defining fundamental civil rights are persuasive authority to be afforded respectful
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tional initiatives and referenda promoted by political leaders and law
enforcement officers hostile to the court's direction-including a bitterly
contested popular vote in 1987 on approval of state supreme court justices, resulting in a change of the court's basic ideological orientationhas placed the state constitution and its terms before the voters at levels
of intensity not matched since the Progressive days.7 3 Indeed, state constitutional law has been at the vortex of recent political storms.
It was surprising, therefore, to find that in 1979, the centennial year
of the California Constitution, neither the legal profession, scholars, nor
the public at large gave much attention to this landmark anniversary of
the California document. This was, of course, in very great contrast to
the observances, both cerebral and celebratory, that marked the bicentennials of the Declaration of Independence in 1976 and the national Constitution in 1987. To my knowledge, the only meeting or conference of any
scope to recognize the California centennial in 1979 was one held at La
Jolla that happened to be organized by the present author.74 A large
number of secondary school teachers attended, but it was not because
they were well informed on the state constitution, as we learned, but
rather because they had long been required to teach the subject of California legal history in their classes, and only about ten percent of those
attending could say that they knew the slightest thing about the subject
or gave it even nominal attention in the classroom. 75 Even more surprising was the fact that in 1979, in the state's leading schools of law, the
consideration, but are to be followed by California courts only when they provide no
less individual protection than is guaranteed by California law.
People v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943, 951 n.4, 538 P.2d 753, 758 n.4, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 n.4
(1975).
73. P. JOHNSON, S. BARNETT, G. UELMAN & S. SHIFFRIN, THE BILTMORE DEBATE:
SHOULD THE JUSTICES BE RETAINED? (1986) (Rose Bird campaign); B. BABCOCK, THE
COURT ON TRIAL (1986); Scheiber, High Courts are a Too-Easy Target, L. A. Times, Oct. 6,

1986, at 5, col. 1. On progressive constitutional politics of the first fifteen years of the century,
see the classic work by G. Mowry, THE CALIFORNIA PROGRESSIVES (1951).
74. See LAW AND CALIFORNIA SOCIETY, supra note 15. In association with those who
delivered papers and with the present author as academic advisor, the television station KPBS,
San Diego, produced CaliforniaRights (1981) (independent state grounds and constitutionalism), which aired on public television stations and was subsequently shown in many public
schools.

75. The author directed a questionnaire survey of high school teachers in the San Diego
area and represents these results from memory. In several summer and weekend institutes on
law conducted for California teachers since 1979, I have regularly asked those attending to
indicate whether they have read the California Constitution, and whether they know anything
of its history and teach the subject. Each time the response has run to ten percent or fewer
who can say yes to this three-part question; ironically, nearly all instructors are eager to teach
the subject, and they have welcomed materials and guidelines for introducing the subject matter in their classes. See Scheiber, The Constitution in the School Curriculum:A ProposalFor

the 1987 Bicentennial, in HISTORY IN THE SCHOOLS 162 (B. Gifford ed. 1988).
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subject of California constitutional law, even with respect to the prominent issues associated with independent state grounds such as women's
rights in the workplace, the separation of church and state, the death
penalty, racial discrimination, and search and seizure, was receiving virtually no attention in constitutional law classes.7 6
This deficiency was all the more astonishing when one considers
that scholars and jurists by 1979 were already writing or ruling from the
bench on the California Constitution's Declaration of Rights and on independent state grounds. Among them were, most prominently, Justice
Stanley Mosk of the California Supreme Court, Jerome Falk of the San
Francisco bar, and Dean (now Justice) Hans Linde of Oregon. Indeed,
well before the 1879 California constitutional centennial, Justice William
Brennan, Jr. had also written searchingly on the emerging doctrine of
independent state grounds, and he had bestowed high praise on the strategies marked out by Justice Mosk and others. 7 It was thus bewildering,
not merely dismaying, for those of us who were pursuing studies of state
law and federalism to see so important a dimension of state constitutional
development woefully neglected in scholarly circles as well as in the public arena.
That day of neglect is now over.78 In the decade since the California
centennial, the importance of state law in the jurisprudence of federalism
has been thrust before us both by the course of relevant United States
Supreme Court rulings and by political events.7 9 It is thus no longer
76. See Friedman, State Constitutions in Historical Perspective, in 496 ANNALS AM.
33 (1988).
77. See Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protection of IndividualRights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489 (1977); R. POST,Justice Brennan and Federalism, in FEDERALISM: STUDIES IN HISTORY, LAW, AND POLICY 37 (H. Scheiber ed. 1988); Scheiber, Federalism and Legal Process:
Historicaland ContemporaryAnalysis of the American System, 14 LAW & Soc'y REv. 664, 686
(1980); Mosk, The State Courts, in AMERICAN LAW: THE THIRD CENTURY: THE LAW BICENTENNIAL VOLUME 213 (B. Schwartz ed. 1976).
The relationships of California and national constitutional law specifically are considered
in McCurdy, California Law and the Federal Courts, in LAW AND CALIFORNIA SOCIETY,
supra note 15, at 16; and Alarcon, State and U.S. Courts' Second Half Century, in id. at 19.
78. The writings of Professor A. E. Dick Howard eventually helped to dispel the fog. See
Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L.
REV. 873 (1976). Professor Howard's sensitivity to the importance of state law was doubtless
the product of his experience as a leader in constitutional revision in Virginia.
79. With respect to the United States Supreme Court, see especially National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1987) and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 496 U.S. 528 (1985). See also State Courts andFederalismin the 1980s, 22 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 599 (1981); Choper, Law Before andAfter Garcia, in PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERALISM
13 (H. Scheiber ed. 1987). With respect to closely related issues of policy and politics, see
Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory Federalism, 70 VA. L. REV.
1429 (1984); Scheiber, Some Realism About Federalism:HistoricalComplexities and Current
Challenges, in EMERGING ISSUES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 41 (1985); and Jorde, Antitrust
ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci.
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conceivable-at least, one earnestly hopes not-for a constitutional law
curriculum to relegate issues associated with the application of state constitutions to the obscurity formerly reserved for what used to be seen as
hopelessly "parochial" fare. 0 Especially welcome are the efforts by the
organizers of the 1989 Hastings symposium to present historical as well
as contemporary research perspectives on the developments that have rekindled interest in state law in our own day.
It would be a fitting highlight of the present inquiry if, given all the
foregoing, one could say that the 1879 California Constitution was a
well-crafted and revered document. Alas, one is not dealing with the
history of what speakers at political ceremonial celebrations would call a
"venerated charter." The 1879 constitution was in fact a disappointment
to many of those who had championed the convention call;8" it was reviled and savagely denounced by its critics; 82 and, as noted already, it

was ultimately nearly eviscerated by the federal courts, on the very matters which had been the most important to many of the delegates-the
anti-Chinese question and the issue of corporate or "monopoly"

powers.8 3
It would also be fitting, in the light of the fascination today with the
doctrine of independent state grounds, if we could say that the convention in 1879 provided us with a full and satisfying record of "original
intent" on that issue. In fact, as section V of this Article will attempt to
demonstrate, the question of state autonomy in the context of federal
structure and constitutional uniformity did absorb the delegates' attention in 1878-79. Very little of any penetrating philosophical or jurisprudential material can be found in the debates, however, as to how
California might extend individual rights beyond what the national govand the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to DeferentialEconomic Federalism, 75 CALIF.
L. REv. 227 (1987).
80. There is now a case book published by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. See R. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(1988).
81. See, eg., the statement by Henry George, in text accompanying note 58, supra; Johnson, supra note 49, at 137-38; DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 1521-24.
82. One leading historian of the era has written: "One sector of the press, under railroad
and corporation influence, as bitterly denounced the convention and all its works as Kearney
had denounced the State's capitalists." R. CLELAND, A HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA: THE
AMERICAN PERIOD 42 (1926).
83. McCurdy, supra note 77, at 16-18; McAfee, ConstitutionalHistory of Railroad Rate
Regulation in California, 1879-1911, 37 PAC. HIST. REv. 51 (1968).
On the "Ninth Circuit jurisprudence" that in the 1880s successfully expanded the reach of
the Fourteenth Amendment regarding the rights of the Chinese, the property rights of corporations, corporate taxation, and railroad regulation, see H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION (1968).
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emnment and its judiciary might mandate. Political and legal theorists in
the mold of James Madison, James Wilson, or John Randolph simply
were not in evidence in the 1878-79 convention. In fact, insofar as the
delegates debated the proper reach of state authority to define individual
liberties, they did so mainly in their quest to find ways of extending the
reach of illiberal policies to disfranchise and remove a minority racial
population.84
As a final observation about how the 1879 document is remembered
historically-when it is recalled at all as a document with a past and a
heritage-one must concede that this constitution, as an artifact of the
nation's past, is much like George Washington's axe: The handle has
been replaced four times and the blade at least twice. The California
instrument survives as an entity whose disembodied spirit speaks to its
origins-but one whose present composition is evidence of many transforming events in the interim. The document has been amended so thoroughly and so often, especially in the modern era of the initiative and
referendum, that we are under a special burden to keep clearly in mind to
what degree such concepts as "original intent" have to do with the deliberations of 1878-79 and to what degree they bear only on subsequent
events, popular debates, and referenda."
Elements of the original 1879 document-for example, some central
provisions of the Declaration of Rights, the church-state and education
sections, and the University of California provisions-are still largely intact and of controlling influence in the state's constitutional jurisprudence. And yet on many other key issues of great current importanceprivacy, for example; or the basic terms of criminal procedure and punishment policies, which were restructured at a single stroke in an initiative ballot in 1982; or environmental and resource regulations; or even
the vexed question of independent state grounds-the voice of this constitution is largely a contemporary one, and also, significantly, the prod84. See infra notes 141-45, 188-93, and accompanying text.
85. One is reminded of the obverse peril of seeking original intent for the United States
Constitution by looking only to the Framers in 1787 and forgetting that "intent" also involves
the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment and subsequently adopted transforming amendments.
Mr. Meese, the former U.S. Attorney General, made a specialty of this oversight, something
for which Mr. Justice Brennan criticized him eloquently in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 11-27 (The Federalist Society/Harvard Society for Law

and Public Policy, Occasional Paper No. 2, 1986). See Scheiber, The Structuresof Liberty, in
CONSTITUTIONAL RooTS, RIGHTS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES (A. Howard ed. 1988), also ap-

pearing in POWER DIVIDED: ESSAYS ON FEDERALISM IN THEORY AND PRAcTICE (H.
Scheiber & M. Feeley, eds. 1989). On Meese's version of "originalism," see also the discussion
in Pollack, "OriginalIntention" and the Crucible of Litigation,57 U. CIN. L. REv. 867, 868-70
(1989).
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uct of the direct ballot.86 In many of the provisions that most keenly
affect the daily life of citizens of California today, the amended constitution simply cannot be adduced as a source of evidence of nineteenth century realities or ideals-except as they may have influenced the twentieth
century political consciousness.
Ill.

Economic Individualism and Public Rights

We find that about fifteen thousand persons own the land of England. Yet, sir, here in this fair young State, we find that sixty landowners and corporations own more land than there is in all
England. They form a landed aristocracy which threatens as much
danger to this State as it ever did to England. If we permit this
thing to go on a few years we will see the great nobilities of KernHaggin, Tevis, and Carr-forming themselves into an aristocracy
which will be worse than was ever seen in England.
-Delegate William P. Grace8 7
Let me say to these men who are so afraid of the [proposed] Railroad Commissioners, that railroad and other transportation companies need not fear the people; but they must come and rest their
heads where you and I rest our heads-upon the bosom of public
justice.
-Delegate C. W. Cross88
Paradoxes that confound any effort at clear-cut historical judgment
leap out from any close study of the 1879 constitution. There is no route
to a simplified characterization of what the convention achieved, for a
cluttered document does not yield an uncluttered interpretive view. In
some ways, however, this was an authentically reformist constitution,
and in that respect it had a coherence that critics too readily deny.8 9
The changes in the taxation system were designed to open up economic opportunity and remove blatant inequities associated with speculation. Disproportionate burdens had long been carried by the small
owners and actual farmers, but now the reforms redistributed those burdens largely at the expense of absentees and large-scale speculators.
Apart from introducing a classic equalization measure of an administrative type, designed to tax landed property at uniform values, the new
constitution also sought to introduce an important tax break for longterm mortgage borrowers by freeing them from taxation on the mort86. See Lee, Power to the People?, supra note 67; Lee, California,supra note 67.
87. DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 1141.

88. Id. at 62.
89. See C. SWISHER, supra note 2 (writing off the constitution as without a vision).
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gaged portion of the estate and shifting that tax to the lender.9 0 As critics of the mortgage tax had predicted, the bankers and other lenders
reacted at first by holding back on credit; but within a short time, they
adjusted rates so as to offset what one attorney termed the "revolution in
the revenue system of the state."9 During the 1880s, in a series of cases
before the California Supreme Court, mortgage lenders sought to gain
immunity from the effects of the new mortgage taxation provision; but
after some wavering, the court came down against their claims, upholding the changes that the new constitution had clearly mandated.9 2
As happens so often in the process of tax reform, however, an accidental beneficiary emerged to profit from what was either poor drafting
or lack of foresight. The shift in the mortgage tax proved to be a windfall
for the state's railroad companies, which typically were mortgaged heavily to out-of-state creditors who could not be touched by the tax.9 3 The
railroad corporations also resisted tax equalization assessments by means
of a prolonged campaign of litigation in state and federal courts. Their
success in these suits was so impressive as to virtually confirm what reformers had said in the 1878-79 debates of the railroad interests-that
these corporations represented a power almost unconquerable in the judicial arena.9 4
Whatever the flaws in the new constitutional design for taxation,
taken as a whole it compared favorably with, say, the California tax system as shaped in our own day by Proposition 13 and its two-tier system
of rates.9 5 As to the impact of the 1879 tax reforms on the state's econ90. See G. BAKKEN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW IN FRONTIER CALIFORNIA: CIVIL
LAW AND SOCIETY, 1850-1890 at 41-72 (1985) (discussion of the history of California mort-

gage statutes and jurisprudence).
91. Edward J.Pringle, counsel in McCoppin v. McCartney, 60 Cal. 367, 368 (1882),
quoted in G. BAKKEN, supra note 90, at 58.
92. G. BAKKEN, supra note 90, at 57-59.
93. Id. The University of California, as a mortgage holder, also escaped the net of taxation, much to the discomfiture of the San Francisco tax authorities; see People v. Board of
Supervisors, 77 Cal. 136, 19 P. 257 (1888) (discussed in G. BAKKEN, supra note 90, at 59-60).
94. W. FUNKHAUSER, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA 299-310 (1913); C.
SWISHER, supra note 2, at 112.
95. No one contending that permitting pre-1978 property purchasers to pay taxes at a
third or even a fifth the level that is imposed upon post-1978 purchasers is in a very strong
moral posture to criticize the taxation decisions made in 1879! In 1989, in response to the
United States Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
County Comm'rs of Webster County, W. Va., 109 S.Ct. 633 (1989) (ruling that informal
county method of assessing new property owners on full market value, while not re-assessing
long-time owners, violated Equal Protection Clause), three lawsuits were filed in California
courts challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 13. See Jacobs, Three Lawsuits Seek to
Dump Prop. 13, San Francisco Examiner, Feb. 13, 1990, at A-1, col. 1; Jacobs, Macy's Suing to
Overturn Proposition 13, San Francisco Examiner, Feb. 13, 1990, at A-6, col. 1. These suits
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omy, regardless of the ameliorating effects of judicial rulings, the buoyant
economic revival of the early 1880s would probably have offset any negative impact the new taxation law might have had on mortgage investment
floWS.

96

The major reform proposals directed at the railroad corporations
resulted in new constitutional provisions that were criticized in the convention as radical-a view shared by scholars such as Professor
Swisher-and were denounced by conservative critics in 1879 as a ruinous policy that would destroy the security of all investments.9 7 The convention halls and newspaper editorial columns in 1878 rang with
protestations that the delegates were waging open war on property. The
proposal for a railroad commission with rate-setting authority, charged
one opponent in the convention, violated "every principle of law, . . .
ever[y] principle of public faith ... of caution, and of common sense."98
Even some of the state Democratic Party's top leadership, the San Francisco Argonaut asserted, were "developing themselves into agrarians and
communists of a type quite as pronounced, more dangerous, and less respectable than that of the sand lot [i.e., Workingmen's] leaders whom
they are anxiously endeavoring to supplant." 99 This school of critics declared that the railroad regulations under consideration (and finally
adopted) would serve to confiscate the honest investments of private sector interests that the community ought instead to protect, and even gubsidize and nurture, for the common good."° A view from the perspective
of our day, even after the deregulation frenzy of the 1980s, would argue
raise equitability issues that were brushed off cavalierly by the California Supreme Court a
decade ago. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22
Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978); see also Los Angeles County Transp.
Comm'n v. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d 197, 643 P.2d 941, 182 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1982).
96. G. BAKKEN, supra note 90, at 56-59.
97. DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 377, 547, 550.
98. Id. at 489. Like others in the convention, Shafter derided the idea that elected or even
appointive railroad commissioners could rationally set rates:
I have been railroading more or less for twenty years. Even with that experience I
doubt my ability to satisfy myself up on the simple question of freights and fares from
here to San Francisco. How much less would be men selected at random, without
experience or knowledge, to administer upon such a great interest as this-men utterly ignorant of the essential low down details of the business?
Id. See also Swisher's discussion of the railroad regulation debate, C. SWISHER, supra note 2,
at 50-65; and Morton Keller's appraisal of the California revised constitution as unique and
radical in M. KELLER, supra note 10, at 113.

99. C.

SWISHER,

supra note 2, at 63.

100. DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 494 (citing the Wisconsin experience under
stringent "Granger" regulation (the Potter Law), which produced a situation in which "all
railroad construction was suspended, foreign credit was withdrawn from the State, the railway
service was greatly deteriorated, and a deep and widespread disturbance of business ensued,"
leading to the Law's repeal).
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to the contrary that the new railroad regulations were well within the
ambit of the emerging legislative and constitutional tendencies of the
Granger laws era. 0 1 Moreover, the 1879 railroad reform provisions certainly do not appear wildly "radical" in the light of post-New Deal (or
even post-Theodore Roosevelt) regulatory innovations and modem ad10 2
ministrative agency powers.
One is forcibly reminded that the California constitutional changes
were well within the four corners of the constitutional discourse and reforms of the 1870s reflected by the United States Supreme Court's decision in 1877 of Munn v. Illinoisl 3 and the companion Granger Cases
upholding state regulation of railroad rates, 1" though these decisions
were themselves under attack in 1878 as having legitimated a grievous
destruction of vested property rights.10 5
Some of the convention's most cogent debates centered on the impact of the emerging regulatory regimes in the states, and particularly on
the performance of the United States Supreme Court in the Granger
Cases; on the legitimacy of blurring separation of powers by blending the
judicial, executive, and legislative functions in a commission; and, in a
broader way, on what one outraged delegate denounced as the "monstrous" doctrine that the police power could be invoked even to mandate
10 6
"what Holbrook & Company shall charge for a sack of onions."
101. See

G.MILLER, supra note

10; E. KIRKLAND, INDUSTRY COMES OF AGE: BUSINESS,

LABOR, AND PUBLIC POLICY, 1860-1897 (1961); Scheiber, PublicPolicy, ConstitutionalPrinciple,and the GrangerLaws: A Revised HistoricalPerspective, 23 STAN. L. REV. 1029-37 (1971).
102. An exception, with respect to "tameness," was the provision that imposed upon corporate directors in general the liability for losses to creditors and stockholders owing to misappropriation or embezzlement by officers. DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 418, 11991207. On the railroad question, see generally C. SWISHER, supra note 2; Sharp, supra note 2;
and, for the history of later developments, McAfee, supra note 83, and Nash, The California
Railroad Commission, 1876-1911, 44 So. CAL. Q. 287 (1962).
103. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
104. See id.; Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1877); Peik v.
Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co., 94 U.S. 164 (1877); Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul
R.R. Co. v. Ackley, 94 U.S. 179 (1877); Winona and St. Peter R.R. v. Blake, 94 U.S. 180
(1877); Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181 (1877); Scheiber, Granger Cases, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 862 (L. Levy & K. Karst eds. 1986).
105. The most notable attack, but scarcely the only one, was Judge Cooley's article, Limits

to State Control of PrivateBusiness, I PRINCETON REV. 233 (1878). See A.

PAUL, THE CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW:- ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895
(1960); C. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS M. COOLEY, CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, AND JOHN F. DILLON UPON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1954); Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of
Public Purpose in the State Courts, 5 PERSPECTIVES AM. HIST. 327, 392-402 (1972), reprinted
in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 327 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1972).

106.

DEBATES

&

PROCDGS.,

supra note 1, at 379, 494-95, 501, 573-75.
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In fact, the panoply of powers vested in the new regulatory commission that the constitution created was no more expansive than powers
that had already been exercised by similar commissions in the Granger
states.1" 7 And indeed, the long-established and honored tradition of
"public purpose" in American law, especially as expressed in eminent
domain doctrines, provided a well-rooted doctrinal basis for the new reform moves. 108
Neither in the tax reforms nor in the regulatory regime created to
bring the railroads under public control did the convention, for all the
concern expressed by the majority of delegates over "monopoly power"
and social inequities, create a legal environment that can possibly be
termed fatal to the entrepreneurial ambitions and expectations of a diverse, hustling population of expectant capitalists such as California harbored. The business of the aforementioned Holbrook & Co., and of
scores of other California mercantile companies like it, surely was not
seriously jeopardized by the new constitution. Indeed, one suspects that
even these very onion merchants may well have welcomed the stringent
rules against discriminatory rates and also some of the other major provisions of the new basic law!10 9
107. See, inter alia, G. MILLER, supra note 10 (Granger states); Jones, supra note 8. An
implied concession on this point was made by one delegate, Henry Edgerton, who had been a
member of the Massachusetts railroad commission. He declared that his mind had changed in
the six years since he had served there, for after his education in "the healthy though disheartening school of experience," he had concluded that to regulate railroad companies coercively
by administrative edicts was improper and ineffective, and that
the business of a railway is based upon, and must be conducted in accordance with
those universal and immutable principles which lie at the base of every other business; that an arbitrary interference with it by government in any form always has
been, and from the nature of the case must inevitably be, in proportion to the extent
to which it is exerted, destructive.
DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 495.
108. The basic work on this topic is the classic study by Leonard Levy, THE LAW OF THE
COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW (1957).
There was also an historic basis for pro-active state intervention in rate setting by dint of
the record in the antebellum canal era, when the state governments in eastern and older midwestern states entirely controlled some of the basic lines of internal transport. They manipulated rates blatantly, despite the strictures ofJohn Marshall's Court on the matter of interstate
commerce, in a system that amounted to the systematic, quasimercantilistic allocation of markets. See H. SCHEIBER, OHIO CANAL ERA: A CASE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT AND THE
ECONOMY, 1820-61, at 247-68 (1970). A cogent and impressive argument on the subject of
public purpose in Americanlaw was offered by Delegate Beerstecher in the debate on corporate privileges and railroad regulation. DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 508-09.
109. See CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 21 (1879, repealed 1974). For a discussion of how
merchants were often adversely affected by the rate-setting practices of unregulated railroads,
and later became heavily involved in the railroad regulation movement, see L. BENSON, FARMERS, MERCHANTS, AND RAILROADS: RAILROAD REGULATION AND NEW YORK POLITICS,

1850-1887 (1955); G. MILLER, supra note 10, at 107-13.
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That the delegates had scarcely embraced the "agrarianism" or
"communism" that their political enemies associated with the Workingmen's cause was dramatically signalled also in the very first article of
the declaration of rights, declaring that the "acquiring, possessing, and
protecting [of] property" were among the inalienable rights of a free people.11 ° This phrase, carried over from the 1849 constitution, expressed
an individualistic ethic in the starkest terms. The concept was in fact as
American as apple pie, insider stock trading, and the Fourth of July; the
phrase had appeared as part of the definition of the "pursuit of happiness," which had been spelled out in some of the earliest state constitutions, as well as in the Revolutionary and Founding era, and it had been
retained in successive constitutional revisions in many states."' It was
an expression of economic liberty-an ideal which, as I have argued elsewhere, has at different times been embraced for diverse purposes by liberal reformers and conservative property-minded elements of our society,
and which was rooted deeply in several key provisions of the national
12
Constitution.

In this regard, the 1879 California Constitution (and also its application in the following century of the state's development) illustrated the
continuing viability of two powerful*competing traditions in American
law. For alongside the faith in privatism and individualism that was associated with private property ownership, the 1879 document also expressed the equally venerable tradition of the common interest pursued
through law-pursued, often, at the expense of the private and individualistic values which otherwise were honored as validating canons for legitimate state and private action. This tradition of asserting public rights
attended to needs, wants, and aspirations that were community-based
and community-defined; it established priorities among conflicting private claims based upon communal goals, and it represented in a positive
and formal way the "rights of the public" which can legitimately override private claims."I3 In the 1879 California Constitution, this strain in
110. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1879).
111. See 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 263 (Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights of 1776) & 375 (New Hampshire Bill of Rights of 1783) (1971).
112. Scheiber, Economic Liberty and the Constitution, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF LIBERTY 75 (Henry E. Huntington Library ed. 1989); Scheiber, OriginalIntent, History, and Doctrine: The Constitution and Economic Liberty, 78 AM. ECON. A., PAPERS AND PROC. 140

(1988).
113. See supra note 108; Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal
History, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 217 (1984). My own approach reflects the pioneering scholarly

contributions of Willard Hurst.- See especially Hurst's penetrating discussion of these themes
in the highly specific context of a midwestern state's resource industry in J. HURST, LAW AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH: LEGAL HISTORY OF THE WISCONSIN LUMBER INDUSTRY, 1836-1910
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American jurisprudence opposed to unfettered capitalism was expressed
in the simple phrase: "Government is instituted for the protection, security, and benefit of the people... ." 114 The language, cast in the context of
fundamental justification for the reserved right of the people to alter the
government "when ever the public good may require it," 115 and embodying the old common-law maxim saluspopuli, in later years would often
be cited in support of extensions of governmental regulation of private
property. 116 In any event, the phrase served to frame the provisions such
as those on taxation and railway corporation law that gave concrete
meaning to public rights.
Perhaps the convention's most conspicuous doctrinal jousting
ground for the confrontation of vested property with the claims of the
public good was, however, in the arena of eminent domain law." 7 This
question became a matter of heated debate in the convention, centering
on four specific proposals. First, adopting language that had been incorporated recently in the constitutions of Missouri and Illinois, the California delegates adopted a provision that property "taken or damaged" by
eminent domain proceedings must be compensated.I By this move, directed mainly against the railroad interests, the delegates were countering the impact of a series of California Supreme Court decisions that
had found "consequential" or "indirect" damages in eminent domain
takings to be not compensable-a doctrine that served to reduce costs
not only for government itself but also for the railroad companies." 9
The railroads, of course, were the chief private sector benefactors of such
(1964). See also the landmark study by Leonard Levy, supra note 108, and discussion in note
108, supra.
114. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1879, repealed 1974; see art. II, § 1).
115. Id.
116. See, eg., Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925) (landmark

zoning decision); cf Associated Home Builders v. Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473,
135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976) (review of California police power doctrine).
117. It had traditionally been so in American courts and constitutional conventions. Expropriation, and its corollary constitutional doctrine of inverse condemnation as a negative
check on the police power, had framed a dramatic contention between the claims of public
power and those of vested rights since the earliest days of the Republic. See Grant, The
'HigherLaw'Backgroundofthe Law of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis. L. REv. 67 (1930); Stoebuck,

A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REv. 553 (1972). For a regional study
offering an important reappraisal of eminent domain law, see Freyer, Reassessing the Impact of
Eminent Domain in Early American Economic Development, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 1263 (1981).
In the case of the 1878-79 debates, the expropriation issues, together with the inversecondemnation implications (as some delegates argued) of declaring water a "public use,"
tended to merge eminent domain with water law questions. See infra notes 128-134 and accompanying text.
118. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14 (1879, repealed 1974; see art. I, § 19) (emphasis added).
119. Green v. Swift, 47 Cal. 536 (1874).
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a doctrine because of the legislature's routine devolution of the eminent
domain power upon railroads.
Second, again following the lead of sister states, the convention also
adopted a provision that went to the heart of procedure in eminent domain takings, providing that "no right of way shall be appropriated to
the use of any corporation, except a municipal corporation of a county or
the state until full compensation therefor be first made in money,...
irrespective of any benefits from any improvement proposed by such corporation .... - 1 2o By this last prohibition on calculating the presumed
benefits in compensation proceedings, the convention sought to address
one of the foremost popular complaints about how eminent domain had
affected private property owners. For in California, as in many other
states, by allowing "offsets" based on alleged benefits of improvements,
the courts had afforded both government authorities and private interests-most notably the railroads-yet another lever by which to extract
significant1 involuntary subsidies from farmers and other property
owners.

12

Third, the delegates adopted as part of the new provisions on corporations a section designed to bring what was commonly termed "monopoly power" unambiguously within the ambit of state authority in the
realms of both takings and regulation:
The exercise of the right of eminent domain shall never be so
abridged or construed as to prevent the legislature from taking the
property and franchises of incorporated companies and subjecting
them to public use the same as the property of individuals, and the
exercise of the police power of the state shall never be so abridged
or construed as to permit corporations to conduct their business in
such manner as to infringe
the rights of individuals or the general
1 22
well-being of the State.

Finally, the eminent domain fight was extended into the realm of
water law, as the convention struggled with the question whether the
legislature should be authorized explicitly to devolve the takings power
on private corporate and individual interests.' 23 Such devolution had
120. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14 (1879,
PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 1189-90.

repealed 1974; see art. I, § 19); see

DEBATES AND

121. See Railroad v. Caldwell, 31 Cal. 368 (1866); Railroad v. Mahoney, 29 Cal. 112
(1865). On the problem of offsets more generally, see Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation,
and Resource Allocation by Government: The United States, 1789-1910, 33 J. ECON. HIsT. 232
(1973). On offsets as an issue in constitutional reform efforts generally in the late nineteenthcentury United States, see Scheiber, Economic Liberty, supra note 112, and Scheiber, Original
Intent, supra note 112.
122. CAL. CONsT. art XII, § 8 (1879, repealed 1972).
123. On the tendency to expand eminent domain devolution in the West in this era, see
Scheiber, Economic History, supra note 111.
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long been approved in all states of the Union with regard to railroad
companies and other transport enterprises such as bridge, turnpike, and
canal proprietorships. The California convention now considered
whether to extend the reach of the takings power, however, by effectively
defining "public use" so broadly as to include privately owned milling,
manufacturing, sanitary, drainage, and irrigation projects. 2 4 Several
delegates attacked the proposal on grounds it patently violated constitutional rights protected under the Fifth Amendment (and presumably the
Fourteenth), while defenders of the proposal responded that drains,
flumes, and mills were no less important to the public-that is, were enterprises of no less a "public purpose," even if private in ownershipthan were railroads or bridges. 125
In the end, the convention sidestepped the issue, leaving it to the
political process and the courts to establish the exact constitutional
boundaries of eminent domain devolution. Instead, the delegates voted
for a procedural innovation that they believed would protect private
holdings adequately from any kind of takings: a provision that compensation must be paid to injured parties, in takings, prior to any actual
1 26
expropriation.
Given the extraordinary importance of California's natural resources in the state's hectic economic development and population
growth since the Gold Rush, it was ironic that-the 1879 constitution gave
relatively little explicit attention to resource management by government.
The conception of a positive state role in a pro-active mode, in resource
management, awaited twentieth-century reform and innovation. 1 27 The
convention did, however, give explicit attention to the matter of water
124. DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 1024.
125. Id. at 1025-26. This debate-both as to the Fifth Amendment and its applicability in
the broad sense of fundamental law protecting vested rights, and as to the division over how
far the concept of "public use" or "public purpose" could be stretched by a state constitution
or its authoritative interpreters-reflected classical elements of the historic tradition in the
United States of eminent domain and regulatory law. See Scheiber, Economic Liberty, supra
note 112.
126. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14 (1879, repealed 1974; see art. I, § 19).
127. See J. HuRST, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1977); McCraw, RegulatoryAgencies, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 788 (Porter ed. 1980). An overview of
California's experience in development of government research, rule making, and positive
management of natural resources is available in G. NASH, STATE GOVERNMENT AND EcONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A HISTORY OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES IN CALIFORNIA, 18491933 (1964); see also A. McEvoy, THE FISHERMAN'S PROBLEM: ECOLOGY AND LAW IN THE
CALIFORNIA FISHERIES, 1890-1980 (1986); and, for state coastal and ocean resource policies
in the late 1940s to 1970, see Scheiber, Pacific Ocean Resources, Science, and Law of the Sea:
Wilbert M. Chapman and the PacificFisheries,1945-70, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 381, 395-426, 48698 (1986).
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rights and ownership, and to the obverse side of this matter: the basis of
the state's authority to regulate water use. 128 Article XIV declared "all
water now appropriated, or that may hereafter be appropriated, for sale,
rental, or distribution,... hereby declared to be a public use, and subject
to the regulation and control of the State in the manner to be prescribed
12 9
by law."
Here again, a matter of urgent public policy evoked a sharp encounter between the demands of economic individualism and the doctrines of
public rights. Delegate Brown of Tulare County represented one extreme, insisting that water was property, pure and simple, so that "a man
has a right to waste or destroy it, just the same as he has a right to kill his
own horse if he chooses." 13 0 Others, including some of the delegates
from San Francisco, where public opinion had been outraged by the
"water monopoly" as it had been exercised by the Spring Valley Water
Company,"' voiced the opposing view. Thus one delegate from the city
warned that the "public use" water provision that was finally adopted
was inadequate because it left the existing private rights in water entirely
intact. He argued, "The waters of the streams in this State are not the
property of individuals, but belong to the State." 13 2 With prophetic accuracy, he warned that this question "will agitate the people of this State at
no distant day, more than any other, railroad corporations not excepted."13' 3 In the end, the convention's provisions regarding control of
water explicitly declared water to be "public," hence subject to regulation, only when sold or rented; and the reform, apparently designedly so,
128. D. PISANI, supra note 11, at 160-61; Sharp, supra note 2, at 276-87. Pisani quotes the
Sacramento Daily Union to the effect that "the new constitution was 'silent as the grave' on
such important questions as mining debris, water monopolies, and the wanton destruction of
forests that protected the state's watersheds. There was some substance to the charge." D.
PISANI, supra note 11, at 161.
129. CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 1 (1879, repealed 1976; see art. 10, § 5).
130. DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 1021 (Delegate Brown, adverting to the decision in The People ex rel. Heyneman v. Blake, 19 Cal. 579 (1862) (holding that water separated from its original source is personal property)).
13 1. A brief summary of the Spring Valley Water Works charter fight and litigation bearing on its corporate powers appears in A. Roth, The California Supreme Court, 1860-79: A
Legal History 182-87 (University of Southern California, 1973) (unpublished dissertation).
132. DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 1021.
133. Id. On the subsequent agitation of politics and the prolonged battles over water law,

see especially the standard work on policy history by Donald Pisani, supra note 11. See also
Miller, Riparian Rights and the Control of Water in California, 1879-1928: The Relationship

Between an AgriculturalEnterprise and Legal Change, 59 AGRIC. HIST. 1 (1985); Scheiber,
supra note 113 (jurisprudential questions). Professor Brian Gray goes over some of the same
ground and looks at more modern materials in Gray, "In Search of Big/oot" The Common
Law Origins of Article X, Section 2 of the CaliforniaConstitution, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.

225 (1989).
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fell far short of bringing the giant water companies and rancher-appropriators under a regime of thoroughgoing regulation by state
1 34
authorities.
Viewed in the large, however, the 1879 constitution clearly did
strengthen the doctrinal and institutional foundations of the state government's regulatory power, even in the water rights field.135 In the same
manner as the California Supreme Court had been seeking since the earliest days of statehood to balance the needs of development against the

need for securing property rights, the 1879 convention attemptedand not so irresponsibly, incoherently or even radically as many commentators have asserted-to bring that balance into line with some of the
new economic and social realities of the West in the era of
13 6

industrialization.

In contrast to the campaign against the Chinese, culminating in
adoption of the 1879 constitution's provisions aimed at their disfranchisement and economic destruction, the convention's provisions on
basic issues of property rights cannot be dismissed as an irrational or
irresponsible response to difficult social and economic problems of the

day.
134. See D. PISANI, supra note 11, at 160-61; G. Miller, supra note 133, at 1, 4-6.
135. This turned out to be so even in the water rights field, because in 1913 the California
Supreme Court interpreted very broadly the terms of the constitutional provision. See D.
PISANI, supra note 11, at 161.
The convention also acted specifically on the matter of tidelands waters and harbors. In
the California Constitution, Article XV, section 1 (repealed in 1976) extended the power of the
state's eminent domain to "all frontages on the navigable waters." In Article XV, section 2,
rights of way for public purposes were reserved for the public against the claims of any private
owners of "frontage or tidal lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or other navigable water in
this state." This section further provided that the legislature should enact laws to give "the
most liberal construction to this provision, so that access to the navigable waters of this state
shall be always attainable for the people thereof." Article XV, section 3 (repealed 1976) further provided: "All tide lands within two miles of any incorporated city or town in this state,
and fronting on the waters of any harbor, estuary, bay, or inlet used for the purposes of navigation, shall be withheld from grant or sale to private persons, partnerships, or corporations."
These provisions of the constitution, interpreted in light of the Spanish and Mexican civil
law heritage, proved highly important in later years with respect to maintenance of harbor
frontage for public uses in some of the major ports and with respect to such resource issues as
offshore oil. Article XV also provided an anchor for much of modem California public trust
jurisprudence. See Selvin, The Public Trust Doctrine in American Law and Economic Policy,
1789-1920, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 1403; The Public Trust Doctrine in NaturalResources Law and
Management: A Symposium, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 181 (1980); Comment, The Tideland
Trust: Economic Currents in a TraditionalLegal Doctrine, 21 UCLA L. REV. 826 (1974).
136. On the California court's balancing act, see McCurdy, supra note 26; Scheiber & McCurdy, Eminent Domain Law and Western Agriculture, 49 AGRIC. HisT. 112 (1975). For the
subsequent history, see Gray, supra note 133; Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law in
American Legal History, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 217 (1984).
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The Grab-Bag of Constitutional Politics: Race Hatred,
Reforms, and "Hybrid Eclecticism"

I have observed that some gentlemen on this floor... have contracted the fatal habit of browsing through the organic laws of
other States, borrowing enough to show a want of invention and
inventing just enough to show a total want of judgment; wrenching
from its context a phrase here and a sentence there ... and then
bringing the result of their labors in here in form of superficial,
charlatanic patchwork, of clumsy hybrid eclecticism, and attempting to pass it off upon the credulity, and judgment of this house
under the authority of great names abroad.
37
-Delegate H. Edgerton
The new constitution's complexity, scope, and prolixity were the
target of much negative comment by delegates and contemporary critics,
but were defended stoutly by its champions. One delegate responded to
expressions of concern on this score, declaring:
I care not if this constitution swells into the magnitude of a code.
Let it be a code if it is right. Principles, if correct, should be eternal ....As we all know, laws are evanescent... Legislatures meet
and pass laws; and other Legislatures
meet and repeal them ....
38
Not so with Constitutions.
The central question of Chinese exclusion cut across several other
prominent issues, especially the regulation of corporate privileges and the
legitimate extent of the state's police powers. Only a few delegates were
willing to stand and defend the rights of Asian residents. One of them
was an otherwise politically obscure figure, Charles V. Stuart, a Sonoma
County farmer of some substance. 139 Denouncing the anti-Chinese hysteria, Stuart reminded his colleagues of the extensive role played by Chinese workers in the state's economy over the previous two decades.
Stuart denounced the personal assaults, exclusion from public schools,
and "murder, arson, and outrage" to which the Chinese population had
been subjected in San Francisco-a city that was guilty, he said, of "cowardice in not protecting them in the exercise of their rights of 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,' which all men are guaranteed under

our flag.""

'

Stuart stood nearly alone, however, and the anti-Chinese provisions
adopted by the convention all passed by large majorities. Despite the
137. DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 489.

138. Id. at 486.
139. Stuart's unique courage in standing up to the anti-Chinese movement is discussed in
T. HITrELL, supra note 34, at 622-24.
140. DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 1239.

Fall 19891

RACE. RADICALISM. AND REFORM

manifest problem of dubious constitutionality, an extravagantly broad
power of regulation was asserted over aliens "dangerous or detrimental
to the well-being or peace of the State." 4 ' Corporations formed under
California law were forbidden to "employ, directly or indirectly, in any
capacity, any Chinese or Mongolian," who were similarly barred from
public employment. 142 "Asiatic coolieism" was declared to be "a form of
human slavery," and it was prohibited, with all "coolie labor" contracts
declared void.143
Numerous lawyers among the delegates were aware that the treaty
obligations of the United States and the constitutional supremacy of the
national government in matters of immigration, citizenship, and guarantee of equal protection all militated against broad state discretion in regulating the Chinese. I" Nonetheless, a brazen declaration of authority was
incorporated in Article XIX for the legislature to delegate to towns and
cities "all necessary power.., for the removal of Chinese without [their]
limits ... and it shall also provide the necessary legislation to prohibit
the introduction into this State of Chinese after the adoption of this Constitution."' 4 5 Recent scholarship has documented well the subsequent
history of these anti-Chinese provisions. They became the grist for the
mill of "Ninth Circuit jurisprudence," as Justice Field and his colleagues
systematically struck down one ordinance after another and nullified all
the 1879 document's key provisions regarding the Chinese.' 4 6 Ironically,
at the very time that the United States Supreme Court was eviscerating
the equal protection content of the Fourteenth Amendment as it applied
to African-Americans--despite the freed Blacks having been, without
question, the chief object of the amendment's original concerns-Chinese
residents in California, with the aid of a few skilled and dedicated attorneys, managed to push judicial doctrine squarely in the opposite direction so far as their rights were concerned. 147
If there was any inspiration or model for the anti-Chinese provisions, it would have been the Black Codes of the antebellum slave South
and the Reconstruction era.' 4 8 For a host of other proposals, and many
of the specific provisions finally included in the 1879 document, it was
141. CAL. CONST. art. XIX, § 1 (1879, repealed 1952).
142. CAL. CONsT. art. XIX, §§ 2, 3 (1879, repealed 1952).
143. CAL. CONsT. art. XIX, § 4 (1879, repealed 1952).
144. See summary of the debate in C. SWISHER, supra note 2, at 86-92.
145. CAL. CONST. art. XIX, § 4 (1879, repealed 1952).
146. The phrase "Ninth Circuit jurisprudence" was coined by Howard Jay Graham. See
H. GRAHAM, supra note 83; see also McClain, supra note 37.

147. McClain, supra note 37; Roche, supra note 64; Salyer, supra note 38.
148. See E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 18631877 (1988); J. FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR (1961).
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either the language of the 1849 constitution or the terms of other states'
constitutions and statutes that guided the drafting of substantive terms
and specific language.149 Among the provisions adopted that gave the
California Constitution its distinctive reformist character were those providing for the eight-hour day in public employment, establishing a strict
separation of church and state in matters of public education, and defining the autonomous powers of the University of California (and also insulating the University from religious sectarian influence in its
administration-no small matter, even so late in the nineteenth cen-

tury). 5 ' Mechanics' liens were also made a matter of constitutional

right-an important labor issue of the day-and imprisonment for debt
was prohibited. 5 '
One is rather startled to discover a serious concern, at least on the

surface, for women's rights, with the new constitution forbidding sex discrimination in admission to any department of the University of California;15 2 and the provision-remarkable for its day-that "[n]o person
shall, on account of sex, be disqualified from entering upon or pursuing
any lawful business, vocation, or profession."' 5 3 Although this last provision took nearly a century's time to be applied fully in regulation of the
California labor market, the 1879 constitution's perpetuation of commu-

nity property in marriage, from the first California Constitution, was of
149. For a complete overview of the major issues, see Sharp, supra note 2.
150. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8 (1879) (church-state separation), § 9 (incorporating the
terms of the founding act of March 23, 1888 and amendments); CAL. CONsT. art. XX, § 17
(1879, repealed 1976 (current version at art. 14, § 2)) (eight-hours rule). In a related churchstate area, the constitution declared that no marriage might be declared invalid "for want of
conformity to the requirements of any religious sect." CAL. CONsT. art. XX, § 7 (1879, repealed 1970; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 4206.5); see Goda, supra note 50; D. Stewart, "Development of Constitutional Provisions Pertaining to Education in California" (University of
California at Berkeley, 1958) (unpublished dissertation).
151. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 15 (1879, repealed 1976; see art. IV, § 3); art. I, § 15 (1879,
repealed 1974; see art. I, § 10).
152. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 9 (1879). In support of the provision for the University's autonomy, one speaker declared that
in all these great institutions [of learning] it is a cardinal principle that they must be
stable. They must be beyond all power of assault and subversion, or they will be a
failure.... [S]o long as it is made subject to legislative caprice; so long as it can be
made subject to the beck of politicians; so long as it can be made to subserve sectarian or political designs, it will never flourish.
DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 1476.
153. CAL. CON5T. art. XX, § 18 (1879, renumbered as art. I, § 8). Of course, not until
Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971), did the clear
meaning of this provision gain recognition in California constitutional law. See Furay, Women's Rights and the California Constitution, in LAW AND CALIFORNIA SOCIETY, supra note

15, at 13.
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154
profound importance to women in that day and subsequently.
Another important cluster of issues pertained to suffrage and to
political and judicial processes. The convention provided for universal
male suffrage for those over twenty-one years of age and resident in California for one year, 155 except that natives of China were excluded from
the ballot.15 6 Suffragists mounted an effort to extend the vote to women,
and a cluster of about ten delegates led a floor fight to amend the article
on suffrage on their behalf. The usual litany of antisuffrage arguments
was then heard at length: Woman's "sphere" was in the home, and it
would "degrade" women to involve them in the sordid world of politics; 157 women were not really interested in political questions, and if
they were to become interested, domestic disharmony would surely result
in many otherwise happy marriages, or, alternatively, women would
merely vote as their husbands did; 153 and the free ballot had been won by
men fighting great wars and revolutions, hence "the ballot belongs to the
men."1 5 9 On the other side, the suffragists contended that the time was
long past when women should be taxed without representation or suffer
from discrimination in a matter so basic as the ballot; it was unacceptable
to have this avenue of expression and power closed to them since they
had already "proved themselves" by their success when they obtained
access to "all the public and profitable vocations of life."' 16 0 Ironically,
some of the most radical Workingmen's delegates were wholly against
women's suffrage, fearing that it would freight the reform constitution

154. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 8 (1879, renumbered as art. I, § 21); see Furay, supra note
153, at 13.
155. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1879, repealed 1972; see art. II, § 2).
156. Id. Also disfranchised was anyone found to be an "idiot, insane person, or... convicted of any infamous crime." Id.
157. DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 1004 (summarizing opposing arguments).
158. Id. at 1006, 1010 (summarizing opposing views). Delegate Steele took offense particularly to the argument that "[t]he best women will not vote," and only "[b]ad women will
vote." Id. One delegate cited the experience of Wyoming, which had been the first territory or
state to adopt women's suffrage, quoting a third-hand report to the effect that "the better class
[of women] became disgusted with the operation of the law, and quit voting." Id. at 1012.
Wyoming anecdotes were then brought forth also fromothe other side. Delegate Steele, an
advocate of women's suffrage, quoted a federal judge in the territorial supreme court of Wyoming to the effect that "[t]he general influence of woman suffrage has been to elevate the tone
of society, and to secure the election of better men to office," and he "thought their experience
[in Wyoming] refuted the objection that women unsex themselves." DEBATES & PROCDGS.,
supra note 1, at 1015.
159. Id. (summarizing opposing arguments).
160. Id.
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with an issue that would cause its defeat in the ratification ballot. 161
A moderate element among the delegates was willing to settle for a
provision that would simply leave the legislature with authority to grant
suffrage to women at any time, or at least explicitly permit legislation
1 62
allowing women as a class to vote on the issue of suffrage extension.
These compromise efforts failed, however, and a last-ditch effort at gaining reversal was thwarted when the convention refused to even hear the
petitions of a group of women Who attended a session in the closing
days.1 6 3 Women's suffrage was not to be triumphant in California for
another thirty-two years.164
A more popular set of concerns was what we may term "processoriented" reforms, a set of new provisions aimed at liberating the legisla16
ture from what was widely seen as its vassalage to special interests. 1
Among the more important innovations was a strongly worded prohibition against "local or special laws" (as opposed to laws of general application), which had in the past been a vehicle for obscuring the devolution
of special privileges.1 6 6 Indeed, the delegates embroidered the prohibition by setting forth a detailed enumeration of thirty-two categories of
legislation in which only general laws might be passed. Also included
was an open-ended category: "all other cases where a general law can be
made applicable."' 67 Limits were placed on the legislature's discretion
with respect to charters for municipal government,16 a blow in favor of
home rule, which was a favorite cause of the more conservative and moderate elements, enraged because San Francisco had been subject to "pillage" by dishonest and irresponsible state legislators. 169

Despite the efforts of opponents to kill the reform effort with an
overdose of sardonic humor-after all, one of them pleaded, so many
others would be hurt by the new provisions, why not spare the poor lawyers 17--a provision was adopted that declared it "lobbying" and as such
161. Id. at 1014 (Delegate Estee: "I hope that these amendments will not be adopted,
because it will have a tendency to load down the Constitution.... There have [been] some
great reforms gone into this Constitution that we hope will be adopted.").
162. Id. at 1364, 1366-67.
163. Id. at 1494.
164. Furay, supra note 153, at 15. The suffragist movement in California launched a
strongly organized campaign in 1896 to introduce the vote for women, but despite active participation by Susan B. Anthony and other national figures in the women's campaign, the measure was defeated. S. Scheiber, untitled manuscript loaned by author, treats this campaign.
165. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
166. CAL. CONsT. art. IV, § 25 (1879, repealed 1966; see art. 4, § 16).
167. Id. (list of 33 enumerated cases).
168. CAL. CONsT. art. XI, §§ 6-8 (1879, repealed 1970).
169. San Francisco Daily Bulletin, April 30, 1878.
170. DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 1283.
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a felony to influence the legislative process through "bribery, promise of
reward, intimidation, or any other dishonest means." 171 A more sweeping effort to make lobbying per se a crime failed to gain adoption. 172
Another subject area of important revision was the system of criminal justice. The old requirement that a felony case must be given to a
grand jury and "prosecuted by indictment" was now dropped, and a simpler procedure for filing, in the superior court, an "information, after
examination and commitment by a magistrate" was substituted as an alternative option. 173 This reform was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Hurtado v. California,174 and, as a practical
matter, "the role of the" grand jury in criminal process shriveled away [in
California] after 1880. 175
Also of considerable interest, especially in light of current day legal
battles concerning libel and first amendment protection of speech, were
17 6
the terms of the 1879 constitution in the area of speech and press.
This is a fascinating realm of state law, largely neglected by historians,
on which the delegates at Sacramento staged a lively debate, subjecting
177
the common law and constitutional questions to searching discussion.
Proposals that were aired but defeated should not be overlooked in
this overview of the varieties of innovation, because (like the proposal for
women's suffrage) they indicate the range of reform ideas that gave impetus to the movement for constitutional revision. Among the losing
causes were proposals to make voting in elections compulsory, to institute a sliding scale of compensation for legislators that would penalize
171. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 35 (1879, repealed 1966; see art. IV, § 15).
172. DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 143, 165, 1283-84.

173. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 8 (1879, repealed 1974; see art. I, §§ 14, 23).
174. 110 U.S. 516 (1884). The Hurtado decision rejected arguments based on the Fourteenth Amendment that a deprivation of due process was involved in the 1879 reform, in this
instance elimination of grand jury indictment in criminal cases. In this respect, the review in
federal adjudication came to a different result than either suits testing provisions of the constitution relating to the Chinese, see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), and discussion
supra note 64, or other provisions relating to taxation and the powers of the railroad commission, see H. GRAHAM, supra note 83. See also McCurdy, California Law and the Federal
Courts, in LAW AND CALIFORNIA SOCIETY, supra note 15, at 16.
175. Friedman, One Hundred Years of CriminalJustice, in LAW AND CALIFORNIA SOCI-

ETY, supra note 15, at 7. For a full analysis of the criminal justice system in operation under
terms of the 1879 constitution, see L. FRIEDMAN & R. PERCIVAL, THE RooTS OF JUSTICE:
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, 1870-1910 (1981).

176. CAL. CONT. art. I, § 9 (1879, repealed 1974; see art. I, § 2).
177. DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 324-38. On libel and constitutional development in the United States, see N. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL (1986); and Post, Defaming Public Officials: On
Doctrine and Legal History, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RS. J. 539 (1987) (review of N. ROSENBERG, supra).
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them for prolonging their sessions, to prohibit divorce for any reason
except adultery, to abolish grand juries altogether, and to move toward
178
appointive (instead of elective) judicial offices.
In sum, if "clumsy, hybrid eclecticism" was evident, so too was a
fairly strong sense of coherence in many of the 1879 document's provisions. There was, to be sure, diffraction and diffusion of reform objec-

tives in the process of compromise; but there was also a clear intent at
reformation and a vision that sought to create a more efficient state apparatus, with new protections against corruption or subversion by special
interests. That an essential element of the resulting compound was a vulgar and unyielding racism was no less indicative of the times, however,
than was the vision of reform.
V.

State and Nation: The Question of Federalism and the
1879 View of "Independent State Grounds"

One of the most dramatic debates of the convention concerned the
classic question of federalism: how much autonomy legitimately remained with the state government, given the terms of the national Constitution; and to what degree were the citizen's rights and the state's
powers to be seen as derived from the California Constitution, rather
than as a residual implicit in the federal design? 179 In modem day constitutional law, both in the state courts and in national constitutional
jurisprudence, intense attention has been focused recently on the issue of
independent state grounds-the definition of citizens' rights under terms
of the state constitutions, beyond those guaranteed under the national
Constitution and its authoritative interpretation by the federal courts.18 0
The California convention witnessed some debate of state autonomy
and the principles of federalism in this context-but mainly to acknowledge or celebrate in a general way the importance of careful definition
and enumeration of rights. 18 ' The most extended debates on this issue,
however, centered in the convention on two other matters. One was the
state's power to control Chinese immigration and status. The other was
the appropriate form and rhetoric for acknowledging (if it were to be
done at all) the formal supremacy of the national Constitution and fed178. For a summary of the major defeated measures, see T. HITTELL, supra note 34, at
625-26.
179. For the classic issues of federalism, see Choper, The Scope of National Power vis-a-vis
the States: The Dispensabilityof Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); for these issues
discussed in an historical context, see Scheiber, Federalism (History), in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 697 (1986).

180. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 234, 238.
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eral authority-a vexed question laden with the political baggage of the
Civil War divisions and partisan bitterness.
As to the debate on the Chinese issue, the delegates voiced strong
and often ideologically based views on the matter of how far state authority could properly reach. On the one extreme was the know-nothing
anti-Chinese element that demanded measures for the immediate physical expulsion of all Chinese, with draconian curbs, even beyond those
finally adopted in the 1879 document, upon the freedom of Chinese residents until they could be expelled.18 2 Leaving aside the lonely few voices
who spoke up for extension of equal protection to the Asian,18 some
moderate and conservative delegates voiced the obvious caveat that
under the national Constitution certain powers could be exercised by
Congress alone. There was less reference to the Fourteenth Amendment
than one might expect, given the prominence of the issue of ratifying this
charter of equal protection at that time in the politics of the nation. 84
Instead the emphasis of delegates' speeches was upon the treaty obligations to China, the negotiation of new treaty terms as the best immediate
recourse for banning of immigration, and the need to work within the
framework of supremacy of federal law. 8 ' Especially interesting, as Professor Bakken has observed,1 86 was the learning exhibited in the debates
involving points on constitutional law, particularly the extended analyses
of decisions of the federal courts dealing with supremacy and treaty obligations.187 Equally intriguing was the extent to which these debates reflected in vivid ways the overlay of issues derived from the era of
secession politics, the Civil War, and the Reconstruction period movement for equality in civil rights for Blacks. I8 8
The second line of debate on the federalism question concerned basic jurisprudential concepts of state versus national authority. As already indicated, one strand of this concern was closely tied to the
question of how much power the state could wield in persecuting the
182. Id. at 92, 105, 638, 739.
183. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
184. See J. TEN BROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

(1951); Bickel, The Original Understandingand the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1955).
185. DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 702-21 (speeches on Chinese, treaty terms).
186. Comments of Gordon Bakken, Professor of History, California State University, Fullerton, at symposium on the California Constitution, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, March 2, 1989.
187. See, eg., DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 649-67.

188. See, e.g., id. at 659-61. The overtones of nullification in relation to assertions of autonomous state authority to regulate the Chinese (even to expel them) were particularly evident in speeches by delegates Barbour and Cross. Id. at 233; see supra notes 182-84 and
accompanying text.
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Chinese. The initial foray into this area of constitutional language and
law occurred when the convention first considered the Declaration of
Rights. Delegates raised fundamental issues of federalism when
presented by the drafting committees with the following language for
what became, in the completed 1879 revision, Article I, sections 2 and 3
of the declaration:
[Sec. 2.] All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for the protection, security, and benefit of the
people, and they have the right to alter or reform the same whenever the public good may require it.
[Sec. 3.] The State of California is an inseparable part of the
American Union, and the Constitution of the United States is the
supreme law of the land.
Henry Larkin of El Dorado, one of the radical anti-Chinese delegates,
immediately moved an amendment that would have substituted in section 2 much more assertive (if imprecise) language as to the reach of the
state's police power. The people of California, Larkin's proposal declared, had "the inherent, sole, and exclusive right to regulate their internal government, and the police thereof ... [and] to determine what is
detrimental to the well-being of the State, and to exhaust the power of
the State to prohibit and prevent it."' 8 9
The issue behind the rhetoric was, of course, the Chinese. The
facade fell quickly when one of Larkin's supporters endorsed his proposal on grounds that "we have an overshadowing curse everywhere present,
in this State, and we want an emphatic declaration in the Constitution,
declaring that this State has the right to regulate her own internal government." 19 0 Another champion of the Larkin amendment argued that
because the United States Government had "declared the relation of the
several States [to itself]" in the federal compact, the state should do the
same. "And, while perhaps it comes very nearly to the old principle of
States rights," he rather abashedly admitted, so long as it stood alongside
the proposed section 3 (reasserting federal supremacy, as quoted above),
it could not be interpreted as an expression of old style nullification doctrine, nor in any way as being "revolutionary against the government of
the United States."' 9 1
The Larkin view, having raised the specter of well-worn nullification
doctrines, states' rights claims, and anti-Unionism in an arena in which
Civil War issues were not yet crowded out and charges of "bloody shirt"
tactics were still common, could not carry a majority for language so
189.

DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 233.

190. Id. (emphasis added).
191. Id.
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sweeping or laden with secessionist overtones. 192 Some of the ideas, however, were the guiding
spirit of provisions incorporated into the sections
193
Chinese.
the
on
When the delegates turned to the assertion of federal supremacy, in
the proposed Article I, section 3, the debate quickly turned on ideas,
phrases, issues, and political accusations that would have been equally
appropriate, in such a dialogue on the constitution, in 1859-60 as in
1878-79.'9' The Democratic regulars were at pains to deny that the Reconstruction amendments had effected significant change in the sphere of
federal versus state authority. The decision of Texas v. White 195 was
cited, for example, as evidence that the United States Supreme Court
"repudiates altogether the doctrine that the character or nature of our
government was changed by the rebellion, or that the victory at Appomattox had anything to do with the fundamental principles of government."' 196 The supremacy of the states' authority "within their respective
spheres"' 197 was an idea very congenial not only to the anti-Chinese delegates but also to doctrinaire opponents of centralization and an expansive
view of the Fourteenth Amendment, that is, to those who denied that the
supremacy issue had been settled by "the case of Grant vs. Lee, decided
at Appomattox," a decision from which there was no appeal. 19 8 Among
the anti-Chinese and the states' rights idealogues, in fact, were a few who
were fanatical enough (or politically naive enough) to advert directly to
secession-a recourse that was warranted, they averred, "if our Government doesn't protect us, and if our Government is [determined] to make
192. For the "bloody shirt" charge (that the Republicans were relying on implications of
disloyalty and treason against those who had opposed Lincoln and the war policy in 1861), see,
e.g., id. at 1182, 1187. On bloody shirt politics in the post-Civil War era, see P. BUCK, THE
ROAD TO REUNION: 1865-1900, at 74-84, 91-98, 107-13 (1937).
193. Some sympathetic delegates, not willing to raise issues of Unionism and states' rights,
thus urged they should be. Id. at 234. See CAL. CONST. art. XIX, §§ 1-4 (1879, repealed
1952).
194. The debate also introduced, from the side of those who had been sympathetic to the
Confederacy and opposed the statement of federal supremacy, language and ideas that were
again made a familiar part of American rhetoric in the 1980s by President Ronald Reagan and
especially his Attorney General, Edwin Meese. This fact speaks eloquently to the pedigree and
vintage of the Reagan-Meese ideas on the constitutional limits of federal supremacy. See also
Scheiber, supra note 113, at 48-50, and the widely noticed speech by Justice Thurgood Marshall drawing the obvious connections between considerations of race relations, and of interventionism versus antigovernmentalism, on the one side, and Meese's notions of the proper
limits of federal authority, on the other, Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United
States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1987).
195. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869).
196. DEBATES & PROCDGS., supra note 1, at 1183.
197. Id. at 238.
198. Id. at 1185.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 17:35

this State a China Empire."' 9 9
Ironically, the proximate origin of the proposed language on federal
supremacy was not a determined drive by "bloody shirt" Republicans or
constitutional idealogues, nor even the concern of the anti-radicals to assert state power against centralization generally or in the anti-Chinese
cause specifically. Instead, the origin lay in responses to a recent public
declaration by the Workingmen's convention-by which the radical leadership sought to defend the movement against charges of "communism"
and hostility to basic American political principles.2 ' 0 "[W]e recognize
the Constitution of the United States," the Workingmen had stated, "as
the great charter of our liberties and the paramount law of the land
.... ,201 When the language the Workingmen had adopted was submitted to the convention as a formal provision for the new constitution,
however, the many faces of the federalism question became manifest: the
diverse motivations and hidden (and not-so-hidden) agendas of racism,
conservatism, states' rights, and zealous Republican nationalism did not
take long to surface.
All this is not to say that the core idea, correctly cherished and nurtured today by proponents of independent state grounds-the idea that
the rights of the citizen against the power of his or her state government
need not stop with the federal Constitution and its judicial interpretation-was absent in 1878-79. There was explicit consideration given to
the idea of independence of the states in regard to definition of rights. To
rely solely upon the national Constitution as the sole "charter of our
liberties," one of the conservative delegates thus declared, "is a mistake
historically, a mistake in law, and it is a blunder all around."2 "2 The
state constitution, Delegate Howard argued, "is as much or more the
2 03a
charter of our liberties than the Constitution of the United States.
Whatever the immediate motives and ideological preferences of the
various factions of delegates who considered these questions in the convention, the subsequent history of California jurisprudence, and of independent state grounds doctrine more generally, is indicative that the
idea of rights based and rooted in the state's own constitution was a robust one. It was strong enough, at any rate, to transcend the immediate
purposes for which some delegates in 1879 pursued the issue; and it
would take new roots in a later era when concern with the redefinition of
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

1186.
241.
238.
1182.
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individual and group rights would become a prominent item in the
agenda of political discourse. 2 4
At first blush, recognition of the ugly tone of the 1878-79 debates of
federalism questions, and especially acknowledging the racist or antiegalitarian impulses that moved many of the delegates, might lead one to
challenge the enthusiasm with which some jurists have pointed to the
"original intent" of the California framers as the champions of independent state grounds.20 5 We do so, however, at the risk of overlooking that
the convention itself eschewed the most assertive general declarations of
doctrine that seemed to echo the principles of Calhoun and nullification.
More importantly, almost a century after the 1879 revision, the people of
California would speak directly to the issue by adopting an unambiguous
declaration of the independent function of the state constitution and ju-

risprudence in the definition of rights.2 "6
It is well to recall the obverse side of plebiscitory action in the field
of defining rights based in the state constitution's provisions: that the
people of California have also pioneered in taking away from themselves,
or at least from affected minorities, what their state supreme court had
given, in the way of rights above and beyond those guaranteed by the
national government. 2 7 Both the plebiscitory style and the often con204. See Falk, supra note 71; People v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943, 951 n.4, 538 P.2d 753, 758
n.4, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 n.4 (1975); see also supra note 72.
205. Generally the California justices who have championed independent state grounds
have portrayed the framing of the declaration of rights in terms of the 1849 convention's work
on the first constitution, rather than in the context of the 1878-79 revision. Only thus can be
explained, for example, Justice Mosk's rather roseate view of the declaration as the product of
a convention "that was a reflection of the youth, heterogeneity and independence of the state."
Diamond v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d. 331, 338, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468, 473, 521 P.2d 460, 465 (1974)
(Mosk, J., dissenting). See also other opinions authored by Justice Mosk: People v. Brisendine,
13 Cal. 3d 528, 549-50, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 328-29 (1975); People v.
Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943, 951 n.4, 538 P.2d 753, 758 n. 4, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 n.4 (1975);
People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 114-15, 545 P.2d 272, 280-81, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 368-69
(1976); DeRonde v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 28 Cal. 3d 875, 893-94, 624 P.2d 220, 230-31,
172 Cal. Rptr. 677, 687-88 (1981) (Mosk, J., dissenting); People v. May, 43 Cal. 3d. 436, 729
P.2d 778, 233 Cal. Rptr. 344 (1987).
206. CAL. CONST. art I, § 24 (1974): "Rights not guaranteed by this Constitution are not
dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution" (adopted November 5,
1974, Resolution Chpt. 90, ACA 60).
207. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Wolfinger & Greenstein, supra note
67 (popular votes against the extension of rights). On low-income housing, see James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (local voters must approve plan), discussedin Lefcoe, The Public Housing Referendum Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1384
(1971). On Prop. 1in 1979 and its reversal of California Supreme Court decisions instituting a
higher standard than that imposed by the federal courts as to school desegregation, see HartNibbrig, School Integration:ConstitutionalLaw, in LAW AND CALIFORNIA SOCIETY, supra
note 15, at 21; and Newman, The Constitution and Ethnic Pluralism, in id. at 25.
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flicting (and sometimes confounding) outcomes of these populistic revisions of the state's constitution through the direct ballot have an
authentic historic resonance in light of the 1878-79 convention and its
context in California politics. In its unpredictable pattern of populistic
currents, not without evidences of illiberal or even outright racist direction,20 8 and also in its tendency to mobilize resourcefully the full range of
powers in the state government's authority and jurisdiction, modern California constitutional politics derive from a long and continuous
tradition.

208. This is a tradition that, as noted earlier, does not exclude the Progressive era of reform. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. Prop. 1 in 1979 took away from the
California Supreme Court the authority to develop its own higher standard of school desegregation requirements, beyond what the United States Supreme Court and federal civil rights
laws were requiring:
A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law
or denied equal protection of the laws; provided, that nothing contained herein or
elsewhere in this Constitution imposes upon the State of California or any public
entity, board, or official any obligations or responsibilities which exceed those imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution with respect to pupil school assignment or pupil transportation ....
CAL. CONST. art I, § 7(a) (1879, amended 1979).

